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Disability, Doctors and Dollars: 
Distinguishing the Three Faces of 
Reasonable Accommodation 
Elizabeth A. Pendo* 
Despite a decade of litigation, there is no consistent understanding of the 
reasonable accommodation requirement of  Title I of the ADA.  Indeed, there are 
three inconsistent distributive outcomes that appear to comport with the  
reasonable accommodation requirement: cost-shifting, cost-sharing, and cost-
avoidance. 
One reason for such inconsistent outcomes is a failure to develop a coherent 
and consistent theory of disability.  Because disability has been and continues to 
be medicalized, this Article takes a fresh look at the medical literature on health, 
illness, and disability.  It recommends the use of the experiential health model 
over the currently accepted functional health model to understand disability in 
the context of the ADA because it captures the contextual, socially-constructed, 
and political nature of disability. 
A second, related reason for inconsistent outcomes is an ambivalent attitude 
toward the costs of antidiscrimination law, often expressed as a tension between 
efficiency and rights.  This Article examines disability-based discrimination in 
the workplace in this context, revealing the underlying tension between 
disability discrimination as a civil rights issue, and the view of disability 
discrimination as a social safety net issue. 
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California, Los Angeles; J.D. 1993, Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California, 
Berkeley.  I am grateful to St. Thomas University School of Law for research support and 
for the opportunity to present and/or discuss my work in progress at the following 
conferences: The 2001 Oxford Round Table, focusing on employment discrimination; the 
2001 AALS Annual Meeting, Section on Women in Legal Education; the 2000 ADA 
Conference at the Ohio State University College of Law; and to the Southern Florida 
Working Group on Bioethics and Health Law.  I am also grateful to Angie Valle-Peters and 
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Using a theory of disability informed by an experiential definition of health 
and the distributive analysis to evaluate the three distributive outcomes 
demonstrates that, although flawed, cost-shifting is the best outcome because it 
embodies an experiential-social model of disability and the potential for both 
socioeconomic and political reconstruction. 
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Despite intense interest in the Americans with Disabilities Act of 19901 
(the “ADA”) for over a decade, there is no consistent understanding of 
the reasonable accommodation requirement of Title I, the employment 
title.  Indeed, at least three distinct distributive outcomes appear to 
comport with the requirements of the ADA.  An employee with a 
disability2 who is willing and able to work within the meaning of the 
statute may: 1) receive reasonable accommodation as defined by law; 2) 
privately bargain for some level of accommodation, as defined by the 
bargaining parties; or 3) leave the workplace with employer-sponsored 
disability leave benefits.  These inconsistencies point to more 
fundamental questions — what does it mean to have a disability, and 
what, if anything, is society obligated to do for people with disabilities?3 
The aim of this Article is to begin to build answers to these questions.  
Part I outlines the reasonable accommodation requirement of Title I of 
the ADA and identifies three inconsistent distributive outcomes 
pursuant to the ADA’s requirements: 1) cost shifting from the employee 
to the employer, based on the ADA’s requirement that employers make 
reasonable accommodation for qualified individuals with disabilities; 2) 
cost sharing between the employee and the employer, based on 
observations that the ADA has actually created a zone of bargaining 
rather than shifting the costs to the employer, and 3) cost avoidance, 
which occurs when the operation of another federal law, The Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 19744 (“ERISA”), enables the 
employer to avoid the requirement of reasonable accommodation.  Part 
II re-examines the medical literature for support in developing a 
coherent theory of disability that is currently lacking, and identifies the 
experiential health model as particularly valuable because it captures the 
 
 1 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994). 
 2 This Article uses the term “individual with a disability,” rather than terms such as 
“disabled person” or “handicapped person,” which tend to define the individual only in 
terms of the disability.  For a discussion of the social meaning of common terminology 
used to identify or describe people with disabilities, see generally Paul K. Longmore, A 
Note on Language and the Social Identity of Disabled People, 28 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 419 
(1985); Tanya Titchkosky, Disability: A Rose By Any Other Name?  “People First” Language in 
Canadian Society, 38 CAN. REV. SOC. & ANTHROPOLOGY 125 (2001). 
 3 See Richard K. Scotch, Models of Disability and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 21 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 213, 214-15, 213-222 (2000) (defining a disability as limitation on 
what people are assumed to be able to do without assistance). 
 4 29 U.S.C. § 1001-1461 (1994). 
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contextual, socially-constructed, and political nature of disability.  Part 
III explores the ambivalent attitude toward the costs of 
antidiscrimination law and disability-based discrimination in the 
workplace, in particular revealing a “deep tension between the view of 
disability discrimination as a civil rights problem, and the view of 
disability discrimination as a social safety net issue.”5  Finally, Part IV 
uses a theory of disability informed by an experiential definition of 
health as well as the distributive analysis to evaluate the three 
distributive outcomes and demonstrates that, although flawed, cost-
shifting is the best outcome. 
I.  THE THREE FACES OF REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION 
The ADA was enacted to “provide strong, consistent, [and] 
enforceable standards [for] ending discrimination against individuals 
with disabilities,” and to bring such individuals into the economic and 
social mainstream of American life.6  In an attempt to remedy the 
widespread problem of discrimination against people with disabilities, 
Congress used its power under the Commerce Clause and the 
Fourteenth Amendment and prohibited discrimination “across the entire 
vista of modern society:  discrimination is prohibited in employment, 
public services, public transportation, public accommodations and 
public services operated by private entities and telecommunications.”7  
Structurally and substantively, the ADA is based on Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), which prohibits discrimination on the 
basis of race, national origin, sex, and religion.  However, the ADA faces 
unique challenges to the implementation of civil rights for people with 
disabilities not faced by Title VII, or prior federal statutes aimed at 
protection of the rights of people with disabilities.8 
 
 5 Leslie Pickering Francis & Anita Silvers, Introduction to AMERICANS WITH 
DISABILITIES:  EXPLORING THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAW FOR INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS 
xv (Leslie Pickering Francis & Anita Silvers eds., 2000) [hereinafter AMERICANS WITH 
DISABILITIES]. 
 6 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101(b)(2) (1994). 
 7 See 42 U.S.C. §2000e (1964). 
 8 Other federal statutes which protect people with disabilities include the Individuals 
with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1485 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) 
(guaranteeing that each child with disabilities will have “individualized plan” so that he or 
she can receive “free appropriate education”), the Developmental Disabilities Assistance 
and Bill of Rights Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. §§ 15001-15115 (2000) (guaranteeing that 
individuals with developmental disabilities and their families participate in design of and 
have access to needed community services, individualized supports and other needs of 
assistance), the Air Carrier Access Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 41705 (1994) (amended 2000) 
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Two distinctive structural features of the ADA stand out in the context 
of Title I — the definition of “disability” and its role in defining the 
protected group, and the reasonable accommodation requirement.  First, 
unlike the case for race or sex, protection for people with disabilities 
raises questions about who should be eligible for protection.  Because the 
ADA grants standing only to individuals who meet the statutory 
definition of “disabled,” it is critical to understand who is covered by 
that definition.  Despite the ADA’s apparent attempt at a broad 
definition of the meaning of “disability,” with respect to any individual: 
1) physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more 
major life activities;9 or 2) a record of such impairment; or 3) being 
regarded as having such an impairment regardless of whether the 
individual actually has the impairment,10 the definition of disability 
remains a controversial and hotly litigated issue.11 Title I also provides 
 
(prohibits any carrier, including a foreign carrier from discriminating against an otherwise 
qualified individual with a mental or physical handicap), the Voting Accessibility for the 
Elderly and Handicapped Act of 1984, 42 U.S.C. §1973ee1-1973ee6 (1984) (improves access 
for handicapped and elderly individuals to registration facilities and polling places for 
federal elections), the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 791-796 (1994 & Supp III 1997) 
(creates regulations for employment of disabled individuals under federal government 
contracts; prohibits any program or activity receiving federal assistance from 
discriminating against, excluding from participation, or denying benefits to any otherwise 
qualified individual with disability; orders removal of architectural, transportation, or 
communication barriers; guarantees that federal employees and members of public who 
are disabled have same access to and use of information and data as federal employees and 
members of the public who are not disabled; provides support system in each state to 
protect legal and human rights of individuals who are otherwise ineligible under 29 U.S.C. 
§ 732, 42 U.S.C. § 15041 (2000), 42 U.S.C. § 10801 (1986)), the Fair Housing Act Amendments 
of 1988 (FHAA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1994 & Supp III 1997) (prohibits discrimination on 
basis of handicap in sale or rental of housing, in residential real estate related transactions 
and in provision of brokerage services).  For discussion of the history and effectiveness of 
these statutes, see RUTH COLKER & BONNIE PODRIAS TUCKER, THE LAW OF DISABILITY 
DISCRIMINATION (3d ed. 1999). 
 9 Major life activities include, but are not limited to, caring for one’s self, performing 
manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning and working.  29 
C.F.R. § 1630.2(I) (1991). Specific exclusions from the category of major life activities 
include:  temporary physical or mental impairments, current illegal dug use, 
homosexuality and bisexuality, sexual behavior disorders, predisposition to illness, 
personality traits, environmental, cultural, or economic disadvantage, advanced age, 
pregnancy.   A major life activity is “substantially limited” within the meaning of the 
statute if the individual is unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in 
the general population can perform, or is significantly restricted as to the condition, 
manner, or duration under which he or she can perform the activity, as compared to the 
general population.  29 C.F.R.§ 1630.2(J). 
 10 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994). 
 11 See Paula E. Berg, Ill/Legal:  Interrogating the Meaning and Function of the Category of 
Disability Anti Discrimination Law, 18 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 8-23 (1999) (describing 
historical concepts of disabilities and outlining current case law interpreting disabilities 
PENDO 5/28/2003  8:19 AM 
1180 University of California, Davis [Vol. 35:1175 
that no employer “shall discriminate against a qualified individual with 
a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job 
application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of 
employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, 
conditions, and privileges of employment.”12  In addition to those 
traditional forms of discrimination based on the provisions of Title VII, 
Title I contains an additional form of discrimination — ”not making 
reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations 
of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant 
or employee, unless [the employer] can demonstrate that the 
accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of 
the business.”13 
Despite intense interest in the ADA and its clearly stated goals of 
providing strong, consistent, and enforceable standards for ending 
discrimination and fostering economic and social inclusion, there is no 
consistent understanding of the reasonable accommodation requirement.  
Indeed, there are at least three distinct distributive outcomes that appear 
to comport with the requirements of the ADA. 
A.  Shifting Costs 
Although the ADA is not the first civil rights legislation to use the 
concept of reasonable accommodation,14 it invested reasonable 
accommodation with significant and far-reaching meaning.  For that 
reason, the ADA is thought to go farther than traditional civil rights laws 
because it requires employers to do more than simply treat individuals 
with disabilities the same way as other similarly qualified applicants or 
workers.  Indeed, the ADA imposes on employers an obligation to 
 
under ADA). 
 12 42 U.S.C § 12112(a) (1994). 
 13 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). 
 14 Prior to the ADA, “reasonable accommodation” had been used in two, very different 
contexts.  Reasonable accommodation is used in § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 
which applies to schools and housing providers receiving federal assistance.  29 U.S.C. § 
794 (1994).  Reasonable accommodation is also used in the context of Title VII’s prohibition 
on discrimination on the basis of religion.  See 42 U.S.C. 2000e(j) (1988).  In TWA v. 
Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977), the court interpreted 2000e(j) as no more than de minimis cost to 
employer and severely restricted the application of the law to avoid conflict with the First 
Amendment prohibition against establishing religion.  See also Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., The 
Americans with Disabilities Act:  Analysis and Implications of a Second Generation Civil Rights 
Statute, 26 HARV. C.R. – C.L. L. REV. 413, 511-14 (1991) (discussing different interpretations 
of “reasonable accommodations” for religion and disability).  The legislature, in the context 
of the ADA, specifically rejected the latter interpretation.  H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 68 
(1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 350. 
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provide reasonable accommodation to make it possible for people with 
disabilities to perform essential job functions and to secure equal 
enjoyment of all terms and conditions of employment.  This obligation 
applies whether or not there is a finding of prior wrongful conduct.  In 
that sense, the reasonable accommodation requirement shifts the costs of 
accommodation from the employee to the employer.15 
As defined by the ADA, reasonable accommodation is a flexible, 
interactive, and personalized process.  Reasonable accommodation may 
include “making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible 
to and usable by individuals with disabilities; and job restructuring, part-
time, or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, 
acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, appropriate 
adjustment or modifications of examination, training materials or 
policies, the provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other 
similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities.”16  Indeed, 
there have been significant court decisions ruling that reasonable 
accommodation includes such changes as specialized testing, training or 
other work procedures,17 provision of specialized equipment or other 
 
 15 This process might more accurately be called re-shifting, as costs first were shifted 
from individuals with disabilities to the federal government through various entitlement 
programs, and then shifted to employers through operation of the ADA.  An estimated 
$200 billion dollars a year in government expenditures support people with disabilities.  
See Sen. Tom Harkin, The Americans with Disabilities Act:  Four Years Later - Commentary on 
Blanck, 79 IOWA L. REV. 935, 937 (1994) (quoting former President Bush’s observation that it 
costs American people nearly $200 billion annually to support people with disabilities). 
 16 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (1994). 
 17 See, e.g., Vollmert v. Wisconsin Dept. of Transp., 197 F.3d 293, 302 (7th Cir. 1999) 
(finding that under ADA, employer did not reasonably accommodate learning disabilities 
that interfered with employee’s ability to master new computer system when it provided 
her with training on new system, where employer was aware of her disabilities, was made 
specifically aware of need for specialized training by physician’s letter, and yet refused to 
provide training sufficiently designed to address her disability, and refused her request for 
tutor trained in learning disabilities after she indicated that tutor likely was available free 
of charge through government agency); Meisser v. Hove, 872 F. Supp. 507, 509 (N.D. Ill. 
1994) (ordering employer to provide the deaf plaintiff with, among other things, speech 
therapy, further job opportunities which would enhance his skills to compete meaningfully 
for future positions, and to provide professional evaluations of his speech); Arneson v. 
Sullivan, 946 F.2d 90 (8th Cir. 1991) (ordering employer to reinstate employee to his 
position of claims representative and to provide him with computer training on new 
computer system); American Fed’n of Gov’t Employees, Local 51 v. Baker, 677 F. Supp. 636 
(N.D. Cal. 1987) (ordering employer, United States Mint, to provide accommodation, 
including specialized training, job restructuring, reassignment, and special equipment, as 
well as individualized accommodations including training which reflected slower paced 
presentation of instructions, modeling, verbal and/or physical prompts, and repetition, as 
well as assisting devices such as gloves, rubber tips, magnifying glasses, and equipment to 
make lifting and carrying easier); Stutts v. Freeman, 694 F.2d 666, 669 (11th Cir. 1983) 
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physical modifications of the workplace,18 and job restructuring.19  The 
employer may choose the type of accommodation, with no obligation to 
make the most efficacious or best accommodation possible or every 
accommodation required, as long as the accommodation made enables 
 
(holding that when employer utilizes test to determine applicant’s eligibility for position, 
handicapped applicant must be accommodated by use of test that accurately reflects 
handicapped applicant’s abilities).  But see Mitchell v. Washingtonville Cent. Sch. Dist., 190 
F.3d 1, 9 (2d Cir. 1999) (school district not required under ADA to retrain and assign 
disabled head custodian to entirely different position, such as courier or bus dispatcher, 
which positions were not available at relevant time); Needle v. Alling & Cory, Inc., 88 F. 
Supp. 2d 100 (W.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding employer has no obligation to retrain disabled 
employee for position for which he is not qualified). 
 18 See e.g., Davis v. Lockheed Martin Operations Support, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d (D. Md. 
2000) (finding reasonable under ADA former employer’s six-week schedule, by which 
former employee with disabling entrapment of certain nerves, which caused her pain in 
groin and upper thigh, would gradually increase her hours back to 40-hour week, and 
employer’s installation of ergonomic chair, adjustable workstations, elevated computer 
table, and cot); Vande Zande v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Admin., 851 F. Supp. 353 (W.D. Wis. 
1994), aff’d 44 F.3d 538 (7th Cir. 1994) (finding that employer had adequately 
accommodated plaintiff by making several modifications to a kitchenette when 
constructing new facilities for plaintiff’s department); Fink v. New York City Dep’t of Pers., 
53 F.3d 565 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding that employer sufficiently accommodated visually 
impaired candidates for promotion by providing them with tape recording of examination, 
tape recorder, reader-assistant to help with operation of recorder and to read questions and 
answers, private room, and double time afforded to other candidates); Davis v. York Int’l, 
Inc., 1993 WL 524761, *8 (D. Md.) (finding as reasonable accommodation employer’s 
providing computer equipment at employee’s home in order to allow her to complete her 
work, because her Multiple Sclerosis caused her to become increasingly distracted when in 
office environment). 
 19 See, e.g., Santiago v. Executive Airlines, 41 F. Supp. 2d 129, 136-37 (D.P.R. 1999) 
(finding that airline’s reassignment of employee with ear condition from flight attendant to 
ramp escort position, rather than granting employee’s request to fly only in pressurized 
aircraft, was a reasonable accommodation under ADA); Karsbusicky v. City of Park Ridge, 
950 F. Supp. 878, 884-85 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (finding reassignment of police officer with 
congenital total hearing loss in left ear to a community service officer position to be 
reasonable accommodation); Hennenfent v. Mid Dakota Clinic, 164 F.3d 419, 422 (8th Cir. 
1998) (finding clinic extended reasonable accommodation within meaning of ADA to 
physician for leg amputation resulting from diabetes, where it provided him with reduced 
work schedules, extended leaves of absence, and backup physicians to assist him with his 
on-call duties); Schwertfager v. City of Boyton Beach, 42 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1364-65 (S.D. Fla. 
1999) (finding city provided employee who had breast cancer and reconstructive surgery 
ample accommodations to achieve qualifications required to perform essential functions of 
her position, and thus, employee did not establish prima facie case under ADA; employee 
was provided assistance and training, and was paid her full salary for extended period of 
time after her surgery, and even after she was reassigned to position of less responsibility, 
she retained her title and salary, though her job functions were greatly reduced); cf. 
Norville v. State Island University Hosp., 196 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 1999) (reassignment does not 
constitute reasonable accommodation under the ADA where a position comparable to the 
employee’s former placement is available, for which the employee is qualified, but the 
employee instead is assigned to a position that would involve a significant diminution in 
salary, benefits, seniority and other advantages that she possessed in her former job). 
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the employee to perform the essential job functions and provides the 
employee with employment benefits equivalent to those of other 
employees.20 
The apparent breadth of the ADA’s reasonable accommodation 
standard is bounded by the undue hardship defense. “Undue hardship” 
is defined broadly as an action requiring significant difficulty or expense 
when considered in light of such factors as the nature and cost of the 
accommodation needed, the overall financial resources of the facility 
involved or of the employer, the type of operation or operations of the 
employer,21 and potential disruption to other workers and the 
production process.22 
Prior to its passage in 1990, the ADA was “greeted with enthusiasm by 
people with disabilities who expected it to produce a noticeable 
expansion of employment opportunities, and with enormous concern by 
employers who fear that its requirement to accommodate workers’ 
disabilities will dramatically increase costs directly or via litigation.”23  
Despite the promise of the ADA, this has not proven to be true.  
Although there have been significant court decisions ruling that 
reasonable accommodation includes such changes as specialized testing, 
training or other work procedures, provision of specialized equipment or 
other physical modifications of the workplace, and job restructuring, 
available data indicates that people with disabilities are failing to achieve 
a noticeable expansion of employment opportunities.  Although there is 
no way of discerning the number or frequency of individual acts of 
discrimination against people with disabilities, post-ADA research has 
“consistently demonstrated that people with disabilities have lower 
average wages and employment rates than individuals without 
disabilities.”24 
The concern that the reasonable accommodation requirement would 
dramatically increase costs of employing people with disabilities also 
appears largely unfounded.  Although the size of the financial burden on 
employers as a result of the reasonable accommodation requirement is 
not clear, a review of the available data suggests that the majority of 
 
 20 See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.9 (1995). 
 21 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10) (1994). 
 22 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p)(2)(v) (1993). 
 23 Nancy R. Mudrick, Employment Discrimination Laws of Disability:  Utilization and 
Outcome, 549 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 53, 54 (1997). 
 24 Marjorie Baldwin, Can the ADA Achieve its Employment Goals?, 549 ANNALS AM. POL. 
& SOC. SCI. 41-42 (1997). 
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accommodations cost less than $100 per employee.25 In fact, the direct 
costs of accommodation of workers with disabilities may be even lower, 
as many companies regularly make informal accommodations that 
require minor and cost-free workplace adjustments and that may enable 
employees with and without disabilities to perform jobs productively, 
cost-effectively, and safely.26 
B.  Sharing Costs 
One important substantive goal of the ADA is to encourage parties to 
share information held by the person with a disability, such as his or her 
specific limitations and abilities, and the information held by the 
employer, such as the essential functions of the job and the feasibility of 
various reasonable accommodations, in negotiations over possible 
accommodations.27  Indeed, several courts have held that employees 
must inform their employer of their disability in order to trigger the duty 
to accommodate and reveal medical information necessary for devising 
an accommodation,28 and that the employer has a duty to confer with 
 
 25 A 1994 report from the President’s Committee on Employment of People with 
Disabilities found that since October 1992, 68% of the accommodations made for workers 
with disabilities cost $500 or less. See Steven B. Epstein, In Search of a Bright Line: 
Determining When an Employer’s Financial Hardship Becomes “Undue” Under the Americans 
with Disabilities Act, 48 VAND. L. REV. 391, 394 n.11 (1995). Materials in the ADA’s 
legislative history indicate costs to businesses for reasonable accommodations are expected 
to be less than $100 per worker for 30% of workers needing an accommodation, with 50% 
of those needing an accommodation requiring no expense at all.  S. REP. NO. 116 (1989).  A 
study commissioned by Sears, Roebuck, and Co. indicated that 69% of the reasonable 
accommodations provided by the company cost nothing, 28% cost less than $1,000, and 
only 3% cost more than $1,000.  Moreover, the average cost to Sears of providing workplace 
accommodations to employees with disabilities was less than $50, compared with an 
average cost of $1,800 and $2,400 for terminating and replacing an employee, respectively.  
See Peter David Blanck, Transcending Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act:  A Report on 
Sears, Roebuck and Co., 20 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 278, 279 (1996).  A 1982 
Department of Labor study finding only 22% of individuals with disabilities received any 
form of accommodation under the Rehabilitation Act, and of that group 51% of the 
accommodations imposed no costs and 30% imposed a cost of less than $500 per worker. 
See Bonnie P. Tucker, The Americans with Disabilities Act:  An Overview, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 
923, 930 (1989). 
 26 Blanck, supra note 25, at 379-80. 
 27 Pamela S. Karlan & George Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, and Reasonable 
Accommodation, 46 DUKE L. J. 1 (1996). 
 28 See, e.g. Barnett v. U.S. Air, 228 F.3d 1105, 1112 (9th Cir. 2000); Taylor v. Phoenixville 
School Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 313 (3d Cir. 1999); Fjellestad v. Pizza Hut, 188 F.3d 944, 951 (8th 
Cir. 1999); Grenier v. Cyanamid Plastics, 70 F.3d 667, 677 (1st Cir. 1995); Smith v. Midland 
Brake, 180 F.3d 1154, 1171-72 (10th Cir. 1999); 125 F.3d 1432, 1434-36 (11th Cir. 1997); Taylor 
v. Principal Fin. Group, 93 F.3d 155, 163-65 (5th Cir. 1996). 
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individuals with disabilities over requested accommodations.29 
Pamela S. Karlan and George Rutherglen assert that the structure of 
the reasonable accommodation and undue hardship doctrines operates 
to create a zone of bargaining.30  Because compensatory and punitive 
damages are available to the individual with a disability only upon proof 
of lack of good faith effort to accommodate on the part of the employer,31 
it is likely that employers will offer some accommodation.  The potential 
plaintiff also faces a substantial risk in the courts.  Thus the potential 
litigant must carefully weigh the potential return from litigation against 
the value of the job with the presumably lesser level of accommodation 
offered. 
The result is a bargaining range, where the minimum the individual 
with a disability is willing to accept is less than the maximum the 
employer is willing to offer.  Karlan and Rutherglen conclude: 
The relatively low cost of many modifications, the safe harbor 
against damages provided to employers who negotiated in good 
faith and the risks attendant on litigation all make it likely that 
employers will offer accommodations.  At the same time, the 
relatively high search costs and dislocation expenses faced by many 
disabled individuals make it likely that they will accept the 
employer’s proffered accommodation, even if it is far from perfect.  
In these cases, employer and employee essentially share the costs of 
 
 29 See, e.g. Jackan v. New York State Dept. of Labor, 205 F.3d 562, 566 (2d Cir. 2000); 
Rehling v. City of Chicago, 207 F.3d 1009, 1015 (7th Cir. 2000); Fjellestad, 188 F.3d at 951; 
Barnett, 228 F.3d at 1112; Phoenixville School Dist., 184 F.3d at 311; Midland Brake, 180 F.3d at 
1171-72; EEOC v. Prevo’s Family Market, 135 F.3d 1089, 1095 (6th Cir. 1998); 125 F.3d at 
1134; Principal Fin. Group, 93 F.3d at 165; Beck v. Univ. Wis. Bd. of Regents, 75 F.3d 1130, 
1135 (7th Cir. 1996); Cyanamid Plastics, 70 F.3d at 677. 
 30 Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 27, at 30; see also Richard V. Burkhauser, The 
American With Disabilities Act:  Social Contract or Special Privilege; Post-ADA; Are People With 
Disabilities Expected to Work?, 549 ANNALS 71, 79 (1997) (“When a pathology begins to affect 
the ability to work, important job related decisions must be made by both worker and 
employee.  These decisions may also be influenced by government policies.  The worker 
will consider the relative rewards of continued work versus applying for transfer benefits.  
In like manner, the social institutions and legal mandates within which the firm must 
operate will influence an employer’s willingness to accommodate the work.”). 
 31 The remedies available under the ADA are the same as those available under Title 
VII.  Before an individual can file a lawsuit, he or she must file a charge with the EEOC 
and/or the relevant state agency and receive a right-to-sue letter.  The remedies for 
violation of Title I include injunctive relief, back pay, job reinstatement, attorney’s fees, and 
compensatory and punitive damages in the case of intentional discrimination.  Under the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991, compensatory and punitive damages are based on the size of the 
employer, and the maximum amounts range from $50,000 to $300,000.  See 42 U.S.C. § 
1981a(b)(3) (1994). 
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the disability.32 
C.  Avoiding Costs 
In the employment context, the ADA prohibits an employer from 
discriminating on the basis of disability against a qualified individual 
with a disability in regard to, among other things, fringe benefits 
including employer-sponsored pension and welfare benefits.33  One such 
benefit is employee participation in an employer-sponsored disability 
benefits plan.34 
Disability benefit plans provide income–replacement benefits to 
employees who are unable to work because of illness or accident.  The 
purpose of such an insurance plan, which may be either employer-
sponsored or privately purchased, is to replace some or all of the income 
lost when an employee is suffering from a disability, as defined by the 
policy at issue.  There are two general types of definitions of disability in 
ERISA-regulated plans.  The first defines disability as the employee’s 
inability to perform the material duties of her own occupation.35  The 
second type defines disability as the employee’s inability to perform any 
occupation or, more narrowly, any occupation for which she is suited by 
education, training, or experience.36  Frequently, plans incorporate both 
 
 32 Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 27, at 30. 
 33 See 29 C.F.R § 1630.4(f) (1993). 
 34 Employer-sponsored disability insurance plans may be either short-term or long-
term in nature.  Under a short-term plan an employee receives a portion of her regular 
wages for a specified period of disability generally not to exceed 26 weeks.  Long-term 
benefit coverage usually starts after short-term disability income benefits cease.  Long-term 
benefit coverage provides a partial income replacement benefit to employees who are not 
likely to return to work because of the total and/or permanent nature of their disabilities. 
 35 See, e.g., Lown v. Continental Cas. Co., 238 F.3d 543, 549 (4th Cir. 2001) 
(“continuously unable to perform the substantial and material duties of his regular 
occupation . . .and under the regular care of a licensed physician other than himself”); 
Glover v. Smith Central Bell Tel. Co., 644 F.2d 1155, 1158 (5th Cir. 1980) (“unable to 
substantially perform all of the material acts of his particular job in the usual and 
contemporary way”); Mizzell v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 118 F. Supp. 2d 1016,1020 (C.D. 
Cal. 2000) (“unable to perform the important duties of his own occupation on a full-time or 
part-time basis because of an injury or sickness that started while insured under [the] 
policy”); Hughes v. Life Ins. Co. of North America, 112 F. Supp. 2d 780, 782-783 (S.D. Ind. 
2000) (“unable to perform all the material duties of his regular occupation”); Gonyea v. 
John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 812 F. Supp. 445, 446 n.1 (D. Vt. 1993) (“able to perform 
none of the usual and customary duties of your occupation”); Brassord v. Continental Cas. 
Co., 630 F. Supp. 951, 955 (D. Conn. 1986) (“completely unable to perform each and every 
duty of your occupation because of accidental bodily injury or disease”). 
 36 See, e.g., Myers v. Hercules, 253 F.3d 761, 766 (4th Cir. 2001) (“not able to engage in 
any employment for wage or profit for which [she is] reasonably qualified by training, 
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definitions in a two-phase structure, with an initial “own occupation” 
stage of between one and two years, and a continuing “any occupation” 
phase lasting until normal retirement age.37  Typically, employees 
 
education, or experience”); Herzberger v. Standard Ins. Co., 205 F.3d 327, 333 (7th Cir. 
2000) (“whether the applicant is unable to perform the duties of the job for which he is 
reasonably fitted by his training or experience”); Hammond v. Fidelity and Guard. Life Ins. 
Co., 965 F.2d 428,431 (7th Cir. 1992) (“unable to perform all of the substantial and material 
acts necessary to the prosecution of some gainful business or occupation”); Rendulic v. 
Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., 166 F. Supp. 2d 326, 329 (W.D. Pa. 2001) (“unable to 
do any work for pay or profit for which [he or she] is or could become reasonably qualified 
by education, training, or experience”); Andrews v. Standard Ins. Co., 2000 WL 549466, at 
*2 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (“is unable to perform with reasonable continuity the material duties of 
any gainful occupation for which [he is] reasonably fitted by education, training or 
experience”); Eriksen v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 39 F. Supp. 2d 864, 867 (E.D. Mich. 1999) 
(“not be able to engage in any type of work”); Torimino v. United Food and Commercial 
Workers Intern. Union Industry Pension Fund, 548 F. Supp. 1012, 1014 (E.D. Mo. 1982) 
(“[the employee] has been totally disabled by bodily injury or disease so as to be prevented 
from engaging in any further employment except for such employment or gainful pursuit 
at which he is unable to earn more than $100 per month . . . [s]uch disability will be 
permanent and will continue during the remainder of his life”). 
 37 See, e.g., Aboul-Fetouh v. Employee Benefits Committee, 245 F.3d 465, 468 (5th Cir. 
2001) (“during the Elimination Period and for the next twenty-four (24) months, the 
Member is prevented by Disability from doing all the material and substantial duties of his 
own occupation.  After that, “Totally Disabled” means that the Member is prevented by 
such Disability from doing any occupation or work for which he is or could become 
qualified by training, education, or experience”); Schindler v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 
141 F. Supp. 2d 1073, 1075 n.2 (M.D. Fla. 2001) (“unable to perform the material duties of 
your regular occupation . . . during the next 12 consecutive months, whether or not the 
monthly benefits are paid for each of these months. Thereafter, you must be totally 
incapable due to illness or injury from performing the material duties of any gainful 
occupation for which you are reasonably fit in training, education or experience.”); 
Demyan v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada, 148 F. Supp. 2d 1316, 1319 (S.D. Fla. 2001) 
(“in a continuous state of incapacity due to illness which 1. while it continues through the 
Elimination Period and during the following 36 months of incapacity, prevents him from 
performing the material and substantial duties of his regular occupation, and 2. while it 
continues thereafter, prevents him from performing the material and substantial duties of 
any occupation for which he is or becomes qualified by education, training or experience”); 
Archible v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 85 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1205 (S.D. Ala. S. Div. 2000) 
(“During the first 24 months of your disability, in addition to your Qualifying Period, you 
must be unable to perform the normal duties of your regular occupation for any employer 
and you must at no time engage in any occupation or employment for pay or profit.  This 
must be due to your disability. . . After the first 24 months of your disability, in addition to 
your Qualifying Disability Period, you must be completely unable to engage in any 
occupation or employment for which you are or become qualified.  You could be qualified 
because of your education, training or experience.”); Hotaling v. Teachers Ins. and Annuity 
Ass’n of America, 62 F. Supp. 2d 731,739 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) (“(a) For the first thirty months of 
Disability, being completely unable due to sickness, bodily injury, or pregnancy to perform 
your normal occupation and not performing any other occupation; and (b) after the first 
thirty months, being unable due to sickness, bodily injury, or pregnancy to perform any 
occupation for which you are reasonably suited by education, training, or experience”); 
Sova v. Wheaton Franciscan Services, Inc. Health and Welfare Ben. Trust, 40 F. Supp. 2d 
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applying for disability benefits are required by the terms of the plan to 
submit sufficient objective medical evidence of their disabilities.38 
Most employee-sponsored welfare plans, including disability benefits 
plans, are governed by ERISA.  ERISA was enacted to encourage 
employer formation of and to protect employees’ rights to pension plans 
and welfare benefits plans by requiring uniformity in the administration 
of benefits plans.  It contains a broad preemption clause, that preempts 
state law insofar as it “relates to” employee benefit plans, 39 and provides 
the exclusive remedial scheme for claims relating to employee benefits 
plans.40 
Unfortunately, ERISA-regulated disability benefits and the structure of 
ERISA’s remedial scheme can be used by employers to avoid the duty of 
reasonable accommodation of employees with disabilities. Consider an 
employee who experiences a disability but remains willing and able to 
work with some accommodation.41  She notifies her employer of the 
disability.  Depending on her familiarity with the ADA and/or the 
 
1031, 1033 (E.D. Wis. 1999) (“the complete inability of the participant, due to injury and/or 
illness, to perform all the important daily duties of his regular occupation for a twenty-four 
(24) month period beginning from the date of the disablement.  For any period extending 
beyond an initial twenty-four (24) month period, total disability means the complete 
inability of the participant to perform the important daily duties of any occupation for 
which the participant may be or may become qualified for by any reason of education 
and/or training and/or experience”); Peterson v. Continental Cas. Co., 116 F. Supp. 2d 532, 
535 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (“during [the first 24 months] . . . continuously unable to perform the 
substantial and material duties of Your regular occupation. . . [after 24 months] 
continuously unable to engage in any occupation for which You are or become qualified by 
education, training or experience”). 
 38 See Wojciechowski v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 2001 WL 38264, at *2 (2d Cir. Jan. 
12, 2001); Skretvedt v. E.I. DuPont de Mours and Co., 268 F.3d 167, 171-72 (3d Cir. 2001); 
Myers, 253 F.3d at 763; Gooden v. Provident Life and Acc. Ins. Co., 250 F.3d 329, 331 (5th 
Cir. 2001); Delta Family Care Disability and Survivorship Plan v. Marshall, 258 F.3d 834, 
837-38 (8th Cir. 2001); Walke v. Group Long Term Disability Ins., 256 F.3d 835, 838 (8th Cir. 
2001); Regula v. Delta Family Care Disability and Survivorship Plan, 266 F.3d 1130, 1133 
(9th Cir. 2001); Levinson v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 245 F.3d 1321, 1324 (11th Cir. 
2001); Pari-Fasano v. ITT Hartford Life and Acc. Ins., 230 F.3d 415, 417-18 (1st Cir. 2000); 
Postma v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 223 F.3d 533 (7th Cir. 2000); Cochran v. Trans-General 
Life Ins. Co., 60 F. Supp. 2d 693, 695 (E.D. Mich. 1999). 
 39 The “Preemption Clause” provides, “[e]xcept as provided in [the Savings 
Clause] . . .[ERISA shall] supercede any and all state laws insofar as they may not or 
hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan.  29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994).  The “Savings 
Clause” exempts state insurance, banking and securities law from preemption.  29 U.S.C. § 
1144(b)(2)(A).  However, self-funded employee welfare plans cannot be deemed insurance 
plans under the “Deemer Clause”.  29 U.S.C. § 1132 (1994). 
 40 29 U.S.C. § 1132. 
 41 This discussion does not address workers who claim they have a record of a 
substantially limiting impairment, or are regarded has having such impairment. 
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feasibility of various potential accommodations, she may or may not 
request accommodation of her disability from her employer.  Imagine 
that the employer is either unaware of the necessity for, or is unwilling 
or unable to provide, accommodation for the employee, and instead 
suggests, encourages, or forces our employee to leave the workplace on 
temporary or permanent disability leave. Because employer-sponsored 
disability plans rarely define disability with reference to reasonable 
accommodation,42 it is entirely possible that the employee may receive 
disability benefits even though she is able to perform her job with 
reasonable accommodation.  As a result, our employee falls into a gap 
between the definition of disability contained in her employer’s 
disability leave policy and the definition of disability contained in the 
ADA. 
Although a plaintiff seeking or receiving disability benefits under an 
employee disability benefits plan, based on proof that the plaintiff is 
unable to work, is not necessarily barred from simultaneously 
contending that her employer discriminated against her under the 
ADA,43 once our employee is placed on disability her standing to assert 
the rights created by the ADA is jeopardized.  In order to have standing 
to challenge an employer-provided disability insurance policy as 
discriminatory under the ADA, a plaintiff must be a “qualified 
individual with a disability,” defined as “an individual with a disability 
who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the 
essential functions of the employment position that such individual 
holds or desires.”44  At least four Circuits have found that a disabled 
former employee is not a qualified individual with a disability as defined 
by the ADA and therefore does not have standing to sue her ex-
employer under Title I.45  In the alternative, if the disabled former 
 
 42 See Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corp, 526 U.S. 795, 803 (1999) (the 
definition of “individual with a disability” for purposes of Social Security Disability 
Insurance (SSDI) benefits does not take the possibility of reasonable accommodation into 
account). 
 43 See Policy Management Systems Corp., 526 U.S. at 802-03 (holding that claims for 
SSDI benefits and for ADA damages do not inherently conflict).  For a discussion of this 
issue, see generally Maureen C. Weston, The Road Best Traveled:  Removing Judicial Roadblocks 
that Prevent Workers from Obtaining Both Disability Benefits and ADA Civil Rights Protection, 26 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 377 (1997). 
 44 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (1994) (“For the purposes of this sub-chapter, consideration shall 
be given to the employer’s judgment as to what functions of a job are essential, and if an 
employer has prepared a written job description before advertising or interviewing 
applicants for the job, this description shall be considered evidence of the essential 
functions of the job.”). 
 45 The Sixth, Seventh, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have found that a disabled former 
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employee is able to get her case into court as a claim under ERISA, she 
will most likely face a bench trial46 governed by an arbitrary and 
capricious standard of review47 and limited to the evidence in the 
 
employee is not a “qualified individual with a disability,” and therefore lacks standing to 
sue his or her former employer under the ADA.  See Morgan v. Joint Admin. Bd., Ret. Plan 
of the Pillsbury Co., 268 F.3d 456, 457-99 (7th Cir. 2001); EEOC v. CNA Ins. Co., 96 F.3d 
1039, 1044-45 (7th Cir. 1996); Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 
1109 (9th Cir. 2000); Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 99 F.3d 181, 186-87 (6th Cir. 1996) 
rev’d on other grounds, 121 F.3d 1006, 1008-09 (6th Cir. 1997); Gonzales v. Garner Food 
Services, Inc., 89 F.3d 1523, 1526 (11th Cir. 1996); see also Bass v. City of Orlando, 57 F. Supp. 
2d 1318, 1323 (M.D. Fla. 1999); Fitts v. Federal Nat. Mortg. Ass’n, 44 F. Supp. 2d 317, 321 
(D.D.C. 1999); Fennell v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 37 F. Supp. 2d 40, 43 (D.D.C. 1999); Beatty v. 
City of Wheaton, 1999 WL 91909, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 11, 1999); Erwin v. Northwestern Mut. 
Life Ins. Co., 999 F. Supp. 1227, 1230 (S.D. Ind. 1998), Fobar v. City of Dearborn Heights, 
994 F. Supp. 878, 882 (E.D. Mich. 1998); Bril v. Dean Witter, Discover & Co., 986 F. Supp 
171, 176 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). Neither the EEOC regulation nor the interpretive guidance 
address the standing issue.  The EEOC has taken the position in litigation that a former 
employee has standing to sue under the ADA so long as he or she is qualified to receive 
benefits.  See Stephen F. Befort, Mental Illness and Long-Term Disability Plans Under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 287, 293 (1999) (citing Leonard F. v. 
Israel Discount Bank of New York, No. 95 Civ. 6964, 1996 WL 634860, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 
24, 1996)). 
  Nor may the employee bring suit against the insurance provider of a long-term 
disability benefit policy as a “public accommodation” under Title III of the ADA.  See 
Weyer, 198 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2000); Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 612 
(3rd Cir. 1998); Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co, 121 F.3d 1006, 1011 (6th Cir. 1997).  But 
see Conners v. Maine Medical Center, 46 F. Supp. 2d 34,  (D. Me. 1999). 
 46 The majority of the Circuits have held that there is no statutory right to a jury trial in 
an action for benefits under ERISA 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e) (1994).  See Katsaros v. Cody, 744 
F.2d 270 (2d Cir. 1984); Cox v. Keystone Carbon Co., 894 F.2d 647 (3d Cir. 1990); Berry v. 
Ciba-Geigy Corp., 761 F.2d 1003 (4th Cir. 1985); Calamia v. Spivey, 632 F.2d 1235 (5th Cir. 
1980); Bair v. General Motors Corp., 895 F.2d 1094 (6th Cir. 1990); Wardle v. Central States, 
Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund, 627 F.2d 820 (7th Cir. 1980); Smith v. City of 
Des Moines Iowa, 99 F.3d 1466 (8th Cir. 1996), Nevill v. Shell Oil Co., 835 F.2d 209 (9th Cir. 
1987); Zimmerman v. Sloss Equipment, Inc., 72 F.3d 822 (10th Cir. 1996); Broaddus v. 
Florida Power Corp., 145 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 1998). 
 47 In 1989, the Supreme Court held that the standard for review of an ERISA-regulated 
benefits decision is determined by the terms of the plan  the standard is de novo, unless 
the benefits plan gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine 
eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan in which case the standard of 
review is abuse of discretion.  Firestone v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989).  Although the plan 
must properly designate a delegate of the fiduciary’s discretionary authority, see 
Rodriquez-Abreu v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 986 F.2d 580, 584 (1st Cir. 1993), no 
“magic words” are required to confer discretion.  See DeNobel v. Vitro Corp., 885 F.2d 
1180, 1187 (4th Cir. 1989).  Courts appear to require language which specifically states 
“discretion to determine questions regarding benefits eligibility.”  Jordan v. Ret. Comm. of 
Rensselaer Polytechnic Inst., 46 F.3d 1264 (2d Cir. 1995); Mitchell v. Eastman Kodak Co., 
113 F.3d 433 (3d Cir. 1997); Haley v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 77 F.3d 84, 88-89 (4th Cir. 
1996); Patterson v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 11 F.3d 948 (9th Cir. 1993).  There is an exception 
for situations where the decisionmaker is operating under a conflict of interest.  Firestone, 
489 U.S. at 115.  What is required to demonstrate a conflict of interest as well as the effect of 
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administrative record.48 
II.  DEFINING DISABILITY:  AN ALTERNATIVE MEDICAL MODEL 
One reason for the inconsistent outcomes identified above is the 
failure to develop a coherent and consistent theory of disability.  Indeed, 
“[o]ne of the most contentious aspects of disability law, research, and 
policy involves the definition of disability.”49  In many respects, the 
courts have treated the ADA as a straightforward extension of traditional 
civil rights protections to people with disabilities.  However, theoretical 
treatment of the ADA is less common than that afforded other civil 
rights statutes, and disability remains undertheorized — ”[c]ompared 
with the enormous volume of literature about race and gender, little 
attention has been paid to the theoretical understanding of disability.”50  
Moreover, although the ADA is modeled on Title VII,51 authors have 
correctly noted that the indiscriminate reliance on Title VII as a 
precedent directs attention away from the distinctiveness of the ADA 
and the important task of developing a theory of disability and 
disability-based discrimination.52 
 
a conflict of interest remain the subject of litigation.  See What Standard of Review Applies 
When the Decision Maker Has a Conflict of Interest (Part I), ERISA LITIGATION ALERT, Mar. 
2000, at 11; Alan P. Woodruff, What Standard of Review Applies When the Decision Maker Has a 
Conflict of Interest (Part II), ERISA LITIGATION ALERT, Apr. 2000, at 1.  
 48 In a case governed by the arbitrary and capricious standard of review, the circuit 
courts are uniform in holding that a court is allowed to consider only the evidence 
presented to the decisionmaker at the time of the decision.  See generally Bernstein v. 
Capitalcare, Inc., 70 F.3d 783 (4th Cir. 1995); Donato v. MetLife, 19 F. 3d 375 (7th Cir 1994); 
Southern Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 993 F.2d 98 (5th Cir. 1993); Miller v. MetLife, 
925 F.2d 979 (6th Cir. 1991); Oldenberger v. Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas 
Teamsters Pension Fund, 934 F.2d 171 (8th Cir. 1991); Winters v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 
49 F.3d 550 (9th Cir. 1995); Sandoval v. Aetna Life and Cas. Ins. Co., 967 F.2d 377 (10th Cir. 
1992); Jett v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama, Inc., 890 F.2d 1137 (11th Cir. 1990). 
 49 Peter David Blanck & Mollie Weighner Marti, Attitudes, Behavior and the Employment 
Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 VILL. L. REV. 345, 352 (1997). 
 50 Francis & Silvers, supra note 5, at xxiv. 
 51 See H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. III, at 26, reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 449 (1990). 
 52 See, e.g., S. Elizabeth Wilborn Malloy, Something Borrowed, Something Blue:  Why 
Disability Law Claims Are Different, 33 CONN. L. REV. 603 (2001); Steven L. Wilborn, A Nested 
Model of Discrimination, www.legalessays.com (1999); see also Stephen Befort & Holly 
Lindquist Thomas, The ADA in Turmoil:  Judicial Dissonance, the Supreme Court’s Response 
and, the Future of Disability Discrimination Law, 78 OR. L. REV. 27, 68 (1999); Bonnie P. 
Tucker, The ADA’s Revolving Door:  Inherent Flaws in the Civil Rights Paradigm, 62 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 335 (2001) [hereinafter Tucker, Revolving Door]. 
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A.  The Traditional Medical Model of Disability 
1.  The History:  A Progression of Models of Disability 
More than a decade ago, political scientist Richard Scotch identified a 
series of theoretical paradigms to explain how disability has been 
conceptualized historically in Western society: the moral model, the 
medical model, the economic model, the social model, and the civil 
rights model.53 
The earliest model, the moral model, interprets disability as a 
reflection of sinfulness and inner spiritual inferiority.54  Although 
vestiges of the moral model remain in modern disability policy,55 for 
more than one hundred years, “disability has been defined in 
predominantly medical terms as a chronic functional incapacity whose 
consequence was functional limitations assumed to result from physical 
or mental impairment.”56  The defining characteristic of the medical 
model is the view that disability is an individual, personal trait of the 
person in whom it inheres.57  The disabled individual is viewed as 
innately biologically different and inferior.58  According to this model, 
the disabled individual’s problem lies in the impairment.59 Consequently, 
the best way to help the disabled person is to use either medicine to cure 
or ameliorate the impairment, or rehabilitation techniques to enable the 
person to cope with or overcome the impairment’s effects.60  Under the 
medical model, “society allocates to physicians the authority to validate 
the existence of the disability and thus to provide an individual with 
 
 53 See Scotch, supra note 3, at 214. 
 54 Jonathan C. Drimmer, Cripples, Overcomers, and Civil Rights:  Tracing the Evolution of 
Federal Legislation and Social Policy for People with Disabilities, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1341, 1345-46 
(1993). 
 55 For example, the ADA appears to contain vestiges of the moral model as illegal drug 
use, 42 U.S.C. § 12210 (1994); homosexuality, bisexuality, and transvestitism, 42 U.S.C. § 
12211(a)(b)(1) (1994); and compulsive gambling, kleptomania, or pyromania, (b)(2) are 
excluded from the definition of disabled. 
 56 Id.  “This model assumed that the primary problem faced by people with disabilities 
was the incapacity to work and otherwise participate in society.  It further assumed that 
such incapacity was the natural product of their impairments, and to some extent their own 
‘secondary’ psychological reactions to their impairments.”  Scotch, supra note 3, at 214; see 
also Mary Crossley, The Disability Kaleidoscope, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621, 649 (1999) 
(defining medical model). 
 57 Crossley supra note 56, at 649-50. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. at 650. 
 60 Id. 
PENDO 5/28/2003  8:19 AM 
2002] Disability, Doctors and Dollars 1193 
access to whatever social assistance may be available to disabled 
persons.”61 
The economic model arose after the advent of World War II,62 and 
views disability as a “phenomenon that lies at the intersection of human 
impairment and the market for labor.”63  The economic model views 
disability as the limiting effect imposed on individuals’ functional 
capacity and is assessed according to how much it restricts people from 
performing the primary or essential activities of their work.64 The 
economic model is intended to promote the economic self-sufficiency of 
individuals with disabilities by increasing their participation in 
compensated labor.65 
In stark contrast to the medical model, the social model of disability 
sees disadvantages as flowing from social systems and structures.66 A 
major premise of this model is that disability is a social construct, rather 
than a biological phenomenon.67  Thus, the disadvantaged status of 
persons with disabilities is the product of a hostile or inhospitable social 
environment, not simply the product of bodily defects.68 Another 
important premise of the social model is that disability may also be a 
cultural construct.69  Stereotypical depictions of disabled persons 
perpetuate social prejudices and bolster the non-disabled person’s fear of 
disabled persons.70  Thus, the barriers embedded in social structures and 
attitudes also construct disability.71 A corollary of the belief that 
disability is a social construct is the view that normalcy itself is also a 
social construct.72 
From the social model grew the civil rights model, based largely on the 
civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s.73  Under this model, the 
 
 61 Id. 
 62 Berg, supra note 11, at 8. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Crossley, supra note 56, at 653. 
 67 Id. at 654. 
 68 Id. An example of how construction of physical environments can create disability is 
the construction of buildings with stairs, rather than elevators or ramps. 
 69 Id. at 655. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. at 656. 
 72 Id. The fundamental shortcoming of the social model is that by focusing on 
environmentally caused disadvantages; it ignores limitations inherent in bodily 
impairments. 
 73 Drimmer, supra note 54, at 1355. 
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legal and social status of disabled persons reflects underlying social 
attitudes and assumptions concerning disability.74 Above all, the civil 
rights model seeks to “unmask the false objectivity that allows society to 
label some of its members ‘disabled’ and treat those citizens as less than 
equal.”75  “In seeking appropriate remedies, the civil rights model adopts 
three goals from the civil rights movement of other minority groups.”76  
The first goal is to eradicate perceptions of inferiority and all other 
irrational reactions.77  The second goal is to eliminate discrimination that 
results from such prejudices.78  Finally, the model “pursues a ‘level 
playing field,’” or equality of opportunity, by aggressively securing 
access to, and independence in, all aspects of society.”79 
2.  The Present:  Centrality of a Traditional Medical Model 
One distinct feature of disability is that it has been linked with 
concepts of health, disease, and illness in U.S. disability policy.  As Paula 
Berg has observed, “the definition of disability in antidiscrimination law 
is part of a larger cultural discourse that establishes and upholds 
dominant notions of health, illness, and disability while imposing a 
particular set of expectations upon individuals deemed to occupy each 
class.”80 
Early disability-based welfare programs medicalized disability, 
defining it as an exclusively individual and clinical concept.81  The ADA 
is generally thought to embody the social and civil rights models of 
disability.82  However, “[d]espite the civil rights intent of this bill, and the 
 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. at 1355-56. 
 76 Id. at 1358. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. at 1358. 
 80 Berg, supra note 11, at 4. 
 81 See, e.g., DEBORAH A. STONE, THE DISABLED STATE (1984) (the disability category as 
an administrative category in the welfare state, and use of medical certification as the core 
administrative mechanism for defining the disability category). 
 82 See Tucker, Revolving Door, supra note 52, at 340 (“[t]he ADA purports to be a civil 
rights law; it was premised on the concept of civil rights for individuals with disabilities”); 
Matthew Diller, Judicial Backlash, the ADA and the Civil Rights Model, 21 BERKELEY. J. EMP. & 
LAB. L. 19, 31 (2000) (“[t]he ADA explicitly adopts a civil rights approach to the problems 
that people with disabilities encounter in the workplace”); Matthew Diller, Dissonant 
Disability Policies:  The Tension Between the Americans with Disabilities Act and Federal 
Disability Benefit Programs, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1003, 1005 (1998) (“[t]he ADA is premised on the 
recognition that barriers to full participation are socially created, rather than the inevitable 
consequence of medical impairments. It establishes the principle that the inclusion of 
PENDO 5/28/2003  8:19 AM 
2002] Disability, Doctors and Dollars 1195 
findings and purposes which recognize widespread discrimination, the 
medical and social pathology treatment of disability is seemingly 
inescapable.”83  Indeed, current ADA jurisprudence suggests a 
recommitment to a narrow and individualistic biomedical model as the 
primary understanding of disability.84  In each of the recent trilogy of 
ADA cases on standing, Sutton v. United Airlines,85 Murphy v. UPS,86 and 
Albertson’s v. Kirkingburg,87 the Supreme Court focused on the objective, 
biomedical nature of the plaintiffs’ alleged impairments, and whether or 
not they represented a substantial personal loss of capacities.88  The 
Court’s restrictive category of disability “reflects and reinforces the 
notion that disability is an objective biomedical phenomenon that 
constitutes an essential aspect of the individual.”89 
Disability also remains undertheorized, in particular the integration of 
health-related and socially-created or -constructed aspects of disability.90  
These two aspects are not necessarily in conflict — we recognize that 
“impairment is not ‘natural,’ but a historically changing category” 
without denying its materiality.91  Even assuming that disability is 
largely socially-created or -constructed, we know little about the nature 
of disability apart from those social forces.  In other words, “[a]fter the 
 
people with disabilities into all aspects of society is a civil right.”). 
 83 Drimmer, supra note 54, at 1399. 
 84 See, e.g., Berg, supra note 11, at 13 (“[d]espite its centrality to anti-discrimination law, 
courts largely eschewed the socio-political perspective when determining whether a 
plaintiff claiming discrimination is disabled and therefore entitled to legal protection.  
Instead, they have remained firmly entrenched in an essentialist biomedical understanding 
of disability, which has resulted in the fabrication of an extremely narrow category of 
disability”). 
 85 527 U.S. 471 (1999). 
 86 527 U.S. 516 (1999). 
 87 527 U.S. 555 (1999). 
 88 There is also evidence that the court’s analysis of the “regarded as” disabled cases 
also demonstrates a return to a traditional medical model of disability.  Berg asserts that, in 
these cases, courts have improperly grafted the actual disability analysis — whether 
plaintiff’s impairment substantially limits one or more of his major life activities — onto the 
“regarded as” prong.  In other words, courts have held that to be “regarded as” disabled 
within the meaning of the ADA, the defendant must falsely perceive that the impairment 
substantially limits one or more of the plaintiff’s major life functions.  Simply 
demonstrating that the defendant discriminated on the basis of a real or imagined physical 
or mental impairment, even when plaintiff’s condition is widely stigmatized, is insufficient 
to prevail.  Berg, supra note 11, at 1. 
 89 Id. at 4. 
 90 Francis & Silvers, supra note 5, at xxiv. 
 91 Jerome E. Bickenbach et al., Models of Disablement, Universalism and the International 
Classification of Impairments, Disabilities and Handicaps, 48 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1173, 1177 (1999). 
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social causes of disadvantage are accounted for, what is left?”92  
Consequently, this Article takes a fresh look at the medical literature and 
its application to developing a theory of disability. 
B.  Re-examining the Medical Literature:  Two Views of Health 
Despite the uncompromising character of the traditional medical 
model of disability, theories of health, illness, and disease in the medical 
literature have alternated between two divergent  perspectives, a 
functional model and an experiential model.93 This debate is significant 
because it resonates with the underlying question of whether disability is 
“a feature of the individual — a biological or medical personal limitation 
— or a feature of society — a social limitation imposed on people in 
virtue of their physical or mental differences.”94 
1.  Functional Health and the Traditional Medical Model of Disability 
The dominant paradigm of health in modern medicine is a biomedical 
model that incorporates a theory of functional determinism.95  The work 
of American philosopher Christopher Boorse provides the most clear 
and influential explanation of that model.96 
According to Boorse, a healthy body is one in which every organ 
makes at least its species-typical contribution to the goals of survival and 
 
 92 Ron Amundson, Biological Normality and the ADA, in AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES 
102-03 (2000). 
 93 Consider the two definitions of health found in the Oxford English Dictionary: 
“soundness of body; that condition in which its functions are duly and efficiently 
discharged” and “spiritual, moral, or mental soundness or well-being.” OXFORD ENGLISH 
DICTIONARY.  See also ROBERT A. ARONOWITZ, M.D., MAKING SENSE OF ILLNESS:  SCIENCE, 
SOCIETY AND DISEASE 8 (1998) (“these ideal typical notions have been in a state of dynamic 
tension since antiquity”). 
 94 Introduction: Definitions:  Who is Disabled?  Who is Protected?, in AMERICANS WITH 
DISABILITIES 87 (2000). 
 95 Indeed, even critics of a functional determinism approach to health concede that 
“the dominant model of disease today is biomedical, with molecular biology as its basic 
scientific discipline.  It assumes disease to be fully accounted for by deviations from the 
norm of measurably biological (somatic) variables.  It leaves no room within its framework 
for the social, psychological, and behavioral dimensions of illness.”  George L. Engel, The 
Need for a New Medical Model:  A Challenge for Biomedicine, SCIENCE, Apr. 8, 1977, at 129, 
reprinted in GEORGE L. ENGEL, FAMILY SYSTEM MEDICINE 318-19 (1992).  See also Roberto 
Moradacci, Health as an Analogical Concept, 20 J. MED. & PHIL. 475, 479 (1995). 
 96 The following discussion is based on two of Boorse’s main works on the subject, On 
the Distinction Between Disease and Illness, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 49-68 (1975) [hereinafter 
Boorse, Distinction] and Health as a Theoretical Concept, 44 PHIL. OF SCI. 542-73 (1977), as well 
as a more recent response to criticisms of his theory, A Rebuttal on Health, in WHAT IS 
DISEASE 3, 6-16 (James M. Humber & Robert F. Almeder, eds., Humana Press 1987). 
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reproduction.  Disease is a state that interferes with or prevents normal 
functioning, defined as species-typical contribution to those goals.  
Health, then, is simply the lack of disease, a state in which all of an 
individual’s bodily or mental functions fall within a normal functional 
range.  Boorse assumes a notion of normal or natural function, which can 
be objectively established by empirically observed biostatistical norms.  
Accordingly, health and disease are individualized, biologically 
determined, and objectively measurable states.  In contrast, illness is a 
subset of disease with normative aspects, and not purely a biostatistical 
phenomenon like health and disease.  According to Boorse, a person is ill 
if and only if the person has a disease which is serious enough to be 
incapacitating, and therefore is 1) undesirable to its bearer, 2) a title to 
special treatment, and 3) a valid excuse for normally criticizable  
behavior.97 
Boorse’s theory of health as an objectively measurable state of 
functional normality continues to be influential in medicine and medical 
ethics.  In a 1981 address to the Association of American Physicians, then 
president Dr. Donald W. Seldin asserted that medicine is “a very narrow 
discipline,” with three necessary features, “biomedical science as the 
underlying basis of medical theory and knowledge, its use for the 
mitigation of specifically biomedical derangements (pain, disability, 
premature death), and its application to the individual human being.”98  
He received a standing ovation.99  More recently, Norman Daniels has 
argued that the preservation and restoration of normal function is a 
primary goal of health care, citing Boorse as the authority on the 
objectivity of normal function:  “[T]he kinds of [health care] needs picked 
out by reference to normal species functioning are objectively important 
because they meet this high-order interest persons have in maintaining a 
normal range of opportunities.”100  Indeed, Boorse’s influence can be seen 
in the prevalence of functional assessment — evaluation of the patient’s 
ability to carry out the basic activities of living commonly defined as 
eating, turning over in bed, using the toilet, moving from place to place, 
walking, dressing, and taking care of personal hygiene — as a measure 
 
 97 Boorse, Distinction, supra note 96, at 61. 
 98 Donald W. Seldin, Presidential Address:  The Boundaries of Medicine, reprinted in THE 
SOCIAL MEDICINE READER 244, 251 (Gail E. Henderson et al., eds. 1997). 
 99 Reported by Gerald T. Perkoff, The Boundaries of Medicine, in THE SOCIAL MEDICINE 
READER 254-52. 
 100 Norman Daniels, Justice and Health Care, in HEALTH CARE ETHICS:  AN INTRODUCTION 
290, 301 (Donald Van DeVeer & Tom Regan eds., 1987). 
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of health.101 
The influence of Boorse’s theory of health as a personalized and 
objectively measurable state of functional normality can also be seen in 
the traditional medical model of disability.  Disability appears as a 
“chronic functional incapacity whose consequence was functional 
limitations assumed to result from physical or mental impairment,”102 
and a person with a disability appears biologically abnormal and 
inferior.103  Clinical measurement and verification of disability,104 as well 
as the development of an index to evaluate function according to the 
ability to perform tasks, are central to the traditional medical model.105   
This influence can be seen in recent Supreme Court decisions relating 
to the ADA.  In Toyota Motor Manufacturing v. Williams,106 the Court 
found that an employee with carpal tunnel syndrome, tendonitis, and 
other acknowledged impairments was not disabled within the meaning 
of the ADA because her impairments did not significantly affect her 
activities of daily life — such as the ability to “brush her teeth, wash her 
face, bathe, tend her flower garden, fix breakfast, do laundry, and pick 
up around the house” — but merely affected the specific tasks of her 
job.107  Similarly, in Albertsons v. Kirkenburg108 the Court upheld 
Albertson’s failure to rehire a driver with monocular vision because he 
did not meet the Department of Transportation’s basic vision standards 
(even though he obtained a waiver of the standards under an 
experimental program).  The Court focused on specific activities of daily 
living and found that although monocular vision is a physical 
 
 101 Of course, functional assessment could be expanded to include aspects of 
psychosocial functioning, including cognition, behavior, and participation in social 
activities, or instrumental activities of daily living defined as cooking, shopping, using the 
telephone, doing laundry, managing medication, doing ordinary work around the house 
and using transportation.  See Naoki Ikegami, Functional Assessment and Its Place in Health 
Care, 332 NEW ENG. J. MED. 598-99 (1995), available at http://www.nejm.org/content/1995 
/0332/0009/0598.asp. 
 102 Scotch, supra note 3, at 214. This model assumed that the primary problem faced by 
people with disabilities was the incapacity to work and otherwise participate in society.  It 
further assumed that such incapacity was the natural product of their impairments, and to 
some extent their own “secondary psychological reactions to their impairments.”  Crossley, 
supra note 56, at 649. 
 103 See Scotch, supra note 3, at 214; Crossley, supra note 56, at 649. 
 104 See STONE, supra note 81. 
 105 Donald L. Patrick, et al., Toward an Operational Definition of Health, 14 J. OF HEALTH 
AND SOC. BEHAV., 6 (1973). 
 106 534 U.S. 184 (2002). 
 107 Id. at 184. 
 108 527 U.S. 555 (1999). 
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impairment within the meaning of the ADA, it did not in this case 
amount to a disability because, in light of petitioner’s natural 
compensation mechanisms, it did not substantially limit his major life 
activities, including the major life activity of seeing. 
Interestingly, despite the placement of the physician as the verifying 
gatekeeper, in many contexts other than recent ADA decisions, the 
definition of disability is linked to the person’s ability to perform his or 
her job.  In other words, disability is the medically verified inability to 
work.109  Accordingly, “[o]ur society has largely obfuscated the difficult 
choices raised by these issues by delegating the assessment of the 
functional impact of medical conditions to the medical profession.  This 
delegation reflects an assumption that such inquiries are subject to 
scientific resolution and do not call for political choices.”110 
2.  Experiential Health and the Social Model of Disability 
Despite the present vitality of the functional model of health, there is a 
compelling alternative — the experiential model of health.  The work of 
Swedish philosopher Lennart Nordenfelt provides the most clear and 
influential explanation of this model.111 
According to Nordenfelt, the experiential model of health is based on 
human welfare,  defined as the ability of individuals to reach their vital 
goals, rather than statistical considerations.112  Health is defined in terms 
of “freedom from illness, the capacity for human development and self-
discovery, and the transcendence of alienating social circumstances.”113 A 
well-known example of the experiential model is the World Health 
Organization’s definition of health as “the state of complete physical, 




 109 See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1) (1994); Deborah Kaplan, The Definition of Disability: 
Perspective of the Disability Community, 3 J. OF HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 352, 354 (2000). 
 110 Matthew Diller, Entitlement and Exclusion:  The Role of Disability in the Social Welfare 
System, 44 UCLA L. REV. 361, 387 (1996) cited in Lars Noah, Pigeonholing Illness:  Medical 
Diagnosis as a Legal Construct, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 241, 282 (1999). 
 111 Lennart Nordenfelt, Concepts of Health and Their Consequences for Health Care, 14 
THEORETICAL MED. 277, 279 (1993). 
 112 Id. at 279-81. 
 113 Sander Kelman, The Social Nature of the Definition Problem in Health, 5 INT’L J. OF 
HEALTH SERVICES 625, 629 (1987). 
 114 World Health Organization:  Basic Documents, 26th Ed., World Health 
Organization, Geneva 1976. 
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The experiential model of health departs from the functional model in 
a number of ways particularly relevant to disability.  The experiential 
model of health rejects an objective, biostatistical concept of “normal.”  It 
critiques any definition of the goal of medicine as the preservation and 
restoration of normalcy, because such a goal presumes that normality is 
real, natural, and legitimate.115  For example, philosopher Ron 
Amundson has written that “to call a typical or average species member 
‘normal’ is to assume a blueprint in the developmental process that 
simply does not exist” from a Darwinian perspective.116  Free from a 
purely descriptivist and statistical definition of normalcy, the 
experiential model of health can take into account variation based on 
environment and mechanisms of compensation. 
Rather than simply focusing on the parts and functions of the 
individual, an experiential model suggests that inquiry should begin 
with consideration of the well being of the individual as a whole, and 
then proceed to a consideration of the parts of the human organism and 
their various functions.117  It rejects making the impairment, pathology, 
or disease primary. 
The experiential model of health entails viewing human beings as 
active creatures living within a network of social relations.  Proponents 
of the experiential model vigorously denounce the “disentaglement of 
the organic elements of disease from the psychosocial elements of human 
malfunction.”118  They reject an ontological, biomedical concept of 
disease that assumes that “there exists some unadulterated biological 
core that is the real disease and that this biological core is frequently 
obscured and distorted by beliefs and attitudes.”119  Instead, health and 
illness are defined as social experiences occurring in the context of 
culture:120 
 
 115 Amundson, supra note 92, at 104-05. 
 116 Id. 
 117 LENNART NORDENFELT, ON THE NATURE OF HEALTH:   ACTION-THEORETIC APPROACH 
(1987); Nordenfelt, supra note 111, at 277-86; Lennart Nordenfelt, On the Relevance and 
Importance of a Notion of Disease, 14 THEORETICAL MED., 15 (1993) [hereinafter Nordenfelt, 
Relevance]. 
 118 Engel, supra note 95, at 318: (citing RF Illustrated 3, 5 (1976)). 
 119 ARONOWITZ, supra note 93, at 171. 
 120 NORDENFELT, supra note 117, at 92; see also Leon Eisenberg, The Subjective in Medicine, 
27 PERSPECTIVES IN BIOLOGY & MED. 48 (1983). “To provide a basis for understanding the 
determinants of disease and arriving at rational treatments and patterns of health care, a 
medical model must also take into account, the patient, the social context in which he lives, 
and the complementary system devised by society to deal with the disruptive effects of 
illness, that is, the physician role and the health care system.”  Engel, supra note 95, at 324. 
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Physicians diagnose and treat diseases, which are thought of as 
entities independent of subjectivity, manifest in abnormalities in 
bodily structure and function.  In this view, a disease is the same 
wherever in the world it occurs, whatever beliefs may be held 
regarding its genesis or cure, and whomever it affects; by definition, 
its pathology can be verified by agreed upon “objective” methods.  
Yet even casual familiarity with the history of medicine indicates 
just how mutable and dynamic disease constructs are.121 
Indeed, as Robert A. Aronowitz writes in Making Sense of Illness, 
“consensus about illness is usually reached as a result of negotiations 
among the different parties with a stake in the outcome.  Insights from 
the clinic and laboratory create options for a new disease or a different 
meaning of an existing name, but do not ultimately determine the 
outcome of a largely social process of negotiation.”122 
The experiential model also recognizes the subjective or value-laden 
nature of health. It challenges the functional model’s distinction between 
disease — conceptualized as an objective pathology — and illness — 
conceptualized as a subjective, social experience.  Instead, it posits 
disease pathology as mutable and dynamic.123  As one proponent 
accurately observes,  “[t]he boundaries between health and disease, 
between well and sick, are far from clear and never will be clear, for they 
are diffused by cultural, social, and psychological considerations.”124  As 
a result, the experiential model has room for the genuine discrepancy 
between illness as actually experienced by the patient, and as 
conceptualized by the biomedical model.  Nordenfelt observes that 
“[m]any bodily and mental states which are intuitively considered to be 
diseases or signs of ill health, need not involve any statistical abnormal 
function” and conversely, that given certain environments, “a certain 
reduction of function can in fact be the statistically normal one.”125  For 
example, tooth decay is considered a pathology to be treated, but is 
sufficiently prevalent to be considered a statistical norm.  Thus, although 
not totally subjective, “[w]hen individuals experience discomfort and 
dysfunction, they can be considered ‘ill’ only when such manifestations 
are recognized as illnesses according to community standards.”126 
 
 121 Eisenberg, supra note 120, at 54. 
 122 ARONOWITZ, supra note 93, at 1. 
 123 Eisenberg, supra note 120, at 54. 
 124 Engel, supra note 95, at 332-33. 
 125 Nordenfelt, supra note 111, at 279. 
 126 “Neither disease nor illness are infinitely malleable both are constrained by biology 
and by culture.”  Nordenfelt, Relevance, supra note 117, at 59. 
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The experiential theory of health resonates strongly with the view that 
disability is subjective, flexible, and profoundly contextual.  Even a 
cursory review of the literature on disability reveals that definitions vary 
according to time, place, and culture.127  One well known example is 
Nora Ellen Groce’s study of hereditary deafness on Martha’s Vineyard.128  
A community on the island experienced a high incidence of hereditary 
deafness over a 200-year period.  In response, in addition to spoken 
English, all members, both hearing and deaf, knew and used an early 
form of sign language to communicate.  Groce found that in this 
bilingual community, deaf community members enjoyed equality in 
childhood, education, marriage, making a living, economic success, town 
affairs, legal responsibility, social life, and community life.  Indeed, she 
notes that community members, both hearing and deaf, did not consider 
deafness to be a disability — “[t]hey were just like everyone else. . . 
[e]veryone here spoke sign language.”129  The deaf did not feel 
stigmatized until summer people arrived and branded them 
“primitives” or “retarded.”130  Groce concludes that disability is a socially 
constructed category, and that “[t]he Martha’s Vineyard experience 
suggests strongly that the concept of a handicap is an arbitrary social 
category.  And if it is a question of definition, rather than a universal 
given, perhaps it can be redefined, and many of the cultural 
preconceptions summarized in the term ‘handicapped’ as it is now used, 
 
 127 For example, the SSDI benefits program defines disability as: 
(A) Inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any 
medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to 
result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous 
period of not less than 12 months; (2) For purposes of paragraph (1)(A) — An 
individual shall be determined to be under a disability only if his physical or 
mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable 
to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work 
experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in 
the national economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate 
area in which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or 
whether he would be hired if he applied for work.  For purposes of the preceding 
sentence (with respect to any individual) “work which exists in the national 
economy” means work which exists in significant numbers either in the region 
where such individual lives or in several regions of the country. 
42 U.S.C. § 432(d)(1)(1994). 
 128 NORA ELLEN GROCE, EVERYONE HERE SPOKE SIGN LANGUAGE (Harvard Univ. Press 
1985). 
 129 Id. at 2. 
 130 Id. at 95. 
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eliminated.”131 
The social construction of disability sees “nonbiological factors —
beliefs, economic relationships, societal institutions — as greatly 
influencing, if not defining, our understanding of [disability].” 132  This 
echoes the insights of Feminist and Critical Race scholars.  Feminist 
scholars, for example, noted that “as the twentieth century began, the 
inferior status and attenuated social participation of women and people 
of color were portrayed as being natural consequences of their 
differences in talent and character.”133  They also exposed the ways in 
which “medical discourses have historically constituted a site of sexual 
discrimination, using medic-scientific justification for differentiating 
women from men on the basis of biology and anatomy and to provide 
‘scientific evidence’ to prevent women from entering public life.”134 As it 
relates to disability, “[t]he social constructionist approach does not 
necessarily call into question the reality of disease or illness states or 
bodily experiences, it merely emphasizes that these states and 
experiences are known and interpreted via social activity and therefore 
should be examined using cultural and social analysis.” 135 
III.  DEBATING DISTRIBUTION:  REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION AND 
COSTS 
A second, related reason for inconsistent outcomes is an ambivalent 
attitude toward the costs of antidiscrimination law, often expressed as a 
tension between the languages of efficiency and of rights.  In the context 
of disability-based discrimination in the workplace, this ambivalence is 
evident in the “deep tension between the view of disability 
discrimination as a civil rights problem, and the view of disability 
 
 131 Id. at 108. 
 132 ARONOWITZ, supra note 93, at 57. In addition to its relationship to an experiential 
theory of health, social constructionism is linked to the emergence of poststructuralism, 
second-wave feminism and Foucauldian scholarship.  DEBORAH LUPTON, MEDICINE AS 
CULTURE:  ILLNESS, DISEASE AND THE BODY IN WESTERN SOCIETIES 11 (1994) (social 
constructionism is not new, but “the growing predominance of poststructuralist analyses of 
issues surrounding concepts of reality and bodily experiences in the humanities and social 
sciences has given renewed vigor and intellectual interest in its application to the area of 
the sociology of health and illness after a long period of marginalization.”) 
 133 Anita Silvers, Formal Justice, in DISABILITY, DIFFERENCE, DISCRIMINATION: 
PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN BIOETHICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 15 (Anita Silvers et al. eds., 1998) 
[hereinafter Silvers, Formal Justice]. 
 134 LUPTON, supra note 132, at 131. 
 135 Id. at 11. 
PENDO 5/28/2003  8:19 AM 
1204 University of California, Davis [Vol. 35:1175 
discrimination as a social safety net issue.”136  Although arguably both 
efficiency and rights may provide a basis for legislation such as the 
ADA,137 the tension between them bears close examination in light of the 
tight relation between the construction of disability and the nature of 
disability rights. 
A.  The Language of Efficiency and the ADA 
1.   Neoclassical Economic Model 
The language of efficiency is exemplified by the neoclassical economic 
model of the labor market.  Simply stated, the goal of the neoclassical 
economic model of the labor market is to “achieve legal regimes whose 
efficiency mirrors those attained in an ideal market of perfectly 
competitive equilibrium.”138 Of course, efficiency has a special meaning, 
typically wealth-maximizing or at least wealth-enhancing.  For example, 
a Pareto model of efficiency provides that a distribution is efficiency 
enhancing if it increases aggregate wealth and also increases the wealth 
of all parties to it.  In contrast, the more utilitarian Kaldor-Hicks 
formulation provides that a distribution is efficient if it generates 
aggregate benefits that exceed the total losses imposed, so that the 
winners could, in theory,  compensate the losers so that no individual 
would be worse off than they were prior to the distribution and at least 
one person would be better off.  In the ADA context, an efficiency 
analysis might begin by comparing employer costs of reasonable 





 136 Francis & Silvers, supra note 5, at xv. 
 137 See C. Edwin Baker, Utility and Rights:  Two Justifications for State Action Increasing 
Equality, 84 YALE L.J. 39, 48 (1975). 
 138  Michael Ashley Stein, Labor, Markets, Rationality and Workers with Disabilities, 21 
Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 314, 314 (2000).  This article was a major source of inspiration for 
this section, as it examines and critiques the application of the neoclassical labor market, as 
defined by Professor Epstein and his supporters, to Title I of the ADA.  In particular, it 
identifies the three main justifications of Professor Epstein as discussed below, and 
analyzes four faulty assumptions underlying the justifications: over-reliance on the 
rationality of the market model, inaccurate assessment of the productivity of workers with 
disabilities, inappropriate weighing of co-worker and client “distaste” for workers with 
disabilities, and omission of significant benefits of employees with disabilities.     
 139  See, e.g., Douglas A. Leslie, Accommodating the Disabled, www.legalessays.com (1999). 
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According to the neoclassical economic model, antidiscrimination 
statutes are inefficient and unnecessary.140  For example, Richard Epstein 
argues that prejudice against people with disabilities is rational and 
efficient, and the ADA is inherently inefficient.141  Professor Epstein’s 
argument that the costs of reasonable accommodation outweigh its 
potential benefits rests principally on three grounds for believing that the 
potential benefits associated with reasonable accommodation of workers 
with disabilities are inherently less than the costs they engender:  people 
with disabilities are inherently less productive than people without 
disabilities; providing reasonable accommodation is always costly to the 
employer; and providing reasonable accommodation incurs the social 
cost of coworkers’ awkward and unpleasant feelings.  Therefore, 
requiring employers to hire people with disabilities when they would 
otherwise choose not to requires those employers to bear costs.142 
Moreover, Epstein and his adherents argue, the costs to employers of 
complying with the ADA greatly outweigh the benefits provided to 
people with disabilities.143  In the words of one economic critic, “[t]he 
central flaw of the ADA is in the imposition on employers of a duty to 
accommodate the mental or physical limitations of the disabled worker 
or applicant without weighing the expected benefits of such 
accommodation . . . This, in combination with the antidiscrimination 
provision, distorts a civil rights measure into what is essentially a 
mandated benefits program for the disabled.” 144 
2.   Critique of the Neoclassical Economic Model 
The common critiques of the neoclassical economic model and its 
application to antidiscrimination law fall along two lines:  the model is 
internally flawed because it relies upon incorrect assumptions and 
incomplete data, and the model is inherently flawed because it 




 140  Michael Ashley Stein, Labor Markets, Rationality and Workers with Disabilities, 21 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 314 (2000). 
 141  See RICHARD EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS (1992); Richard Epstein, Two Conceptions 
of Civil Rights, 8 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y J. 38 (1991). 
 142  See Stein, supra note 138, at 317. 
 143  See, e.g., Christopher J. Willis, Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act:  Disabling 
the Disabled, 25 CUMB. L. REV. 715 (1995). 
 144  Carolyn L. Weaver, Incentives versus Controls in Federal Disability Policy, in DISABILITY 
AND WORK:  INCENTIVES: RIGHTS AND OPPORTUNITIES 5 (Carolyn L. Weaver, ed. 1991). 
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As to the first line of critique, the central assumption of the 
neoclassical economic model is that the market is rational.145   However, 
many have persuasively argued a set of theories to explain the 
persistence of group-based employment discrimination — to satisfy a 
personal preference or “taste” for discrimination,146 to achieve higher 
status within the group,147 or to minimize the cost of employee diversity 
and divisiveness.148  Specifically, disability can evoke irrational behavior 
that is not inherently different than parallel historical responses by the 
dominant majority to the exclusion of other groups. 149 
As to the second line of critique, there is substantial empirical evidence 
refuting the valuation of costs and benefits in the context of employment 
of people with disabilities. As noted above, an efficiency analysis would 
compare employer costs of reasonable accommodation to the employee 
benefits of reasonable accommodation.  As to the employer costs, people 
with disabilities are not inherently less productive.  Even prior to the 
ADA, studies indicated that employees with disabilities demonstrate 
good to excellent work performance, no increase in insurance costs, 
lower turnover than workers without disabilities, lower rates of 
absenteeism, and lower rates of accident.150  Nor is providing reasonable 
accommodation always costly.  Although the size of the financial burden 
on employers as a result of the reasonable accommodation requirement 
is not clear, a review of the available data suggests that the majority of 
accommodations cost less than $100 per employee.151  Indeed, after a 
 
 145  A second faulty assumption is that efficiency can be measured in some objective 
manner. As noted by Duncan Kennedy more than 20 years ago, efficiency is an 
indeterminate concept, and there is no agreement as to how externalities can be measured 
from the setting of entitlement.  Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement 
Problems:  A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REV. 387 (1981). 
 146  GARY BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 14 (3d ed. 1971). 
 147  Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict:  The Economics of Group Status 
Production and Race Discrimination, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1003 (1995). 
 148  EPSTEIN, supra note 140. 
 149  Stein, supra note 138, at 314.  Here, too, the data is incomplete.  Blanck & Marti, supra 
note 49, at 359 (“Study is lacking on the relationship between employer attitudes and 
behavior toward disability, and biases inherent in the purported qualifications required to 
perform jobs.”); id. at 367 (“Another area worthy of study is the relation of employers’ 
organizational cultures to employment and work benefit decisions involving qualified job 
applicants with hidden and perceived disabilities.”). 
 150  The March-April Issue of In the Mainstream reviewed 11 studies related to the 
employment of persons with disabilities and the results were consistent among all studies 
from 1948-1990. 
 151  A 1994 report from the President’s Committee on Employment of People with 
Disabilities found that since October 1992, 68% of the accommodations made for workers 
with disabilities cost $500 or less.  See Epstein, supra note 25, at 394 n.11.  “Materials in the 
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review of the available data, one author concludes: 
From an economic perspective, although the direct costs of the 
accommodations for any particular disability tend to be low, many 
companies regularly make informal and undocumented 
accommodations that require minor and cost-free workplace 
adjustments that are implemented directly by employees and their 
supervisors.  For qualified employees whose conditions are 
asymptomatic or controlled by medication, any such necessary 
accommodations are typically minimal.  Moreover, 
accommodations involving universally designed and advanced 
technology have been shown to enable groups of  employees with 
and without disabilities to perform jobs productively, cost-
effectively, and safely.  These findings suggested that the direct 
costs of accommodations may be lower than predicted.152 
As to the employee benefit, it is difficult to measure the value of 
reasonable accommodation to the employee.153  Moreover, the structure 
of the comparison overlooks the benefits to the employer.  As noted by 
Michael Ashley Stein, such benefits may include:  savings in recruitment, 
training, and replacement expenses; higher productivity; greater 
dedication, fewer insurance claims, a reduction of post-injury 
rehabilitation costs, and more widespread use of available technologies; 
public costs savings, including reduction of disability-related public 
assistance obligations estimated at $120 billion annually; and intangible 
benefits such as  permitting people with disabilities to exercise all the 
responsibilities of citizenship.154   
 
ADA’s legislative history indicate costs to businesses for reasonable accommodations are 
expected to be less than $100 per worker for 30% of workers needing an accommodation, 
with 51% of those needing an accommodation requiring no expense at all.”  S. REP. NO. 
116, (1989).  A study commissioned by Sears, Roebuck, and Co. indicated that 69% of the 
reasonable accommodations provided by the company cost nothing, 28% cost less than 
$1,000, and only 3% cost more than $1,000.  Moreover, the average cost to Sears of 
providing workplace accommodations to employees with disabilities was less than $50, 
compared with an average cost of $1,800 and $2,400 for terminating and replacing an 
employee, respectively.  See Blanck, supra note 25, at 283.  A 1982 Department of Labor 
study found only 22% of individuals with disabilities received any form of accommodation 
under the Rehabilitation Act, and of that group 51% of the accommodations imposed no 
costs and 30% imposed a cost of less than $500 per worker.  See Tucker, supra note 25, at 
930. 
 152  Blanck & Marti, supra note 49, at 379-80. 
 153  Gregory Crespi, Efficiency Rejected:  Evaluating “Undue Hardship” Claims Under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, 26 TULSA L.J. 1 (1990). 
 154  Stein, supra note 138, at 326-27.  See also Blanck & Marti, supra note 49, at 377-81; 
PETER DAVID BLANCK, Studying Disability, Employment Policy and the ADA, in AMERICANS 
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Others argue that even if these foundational assumptions and 
valuations were corrected, the neoclassical economic model would still 
be inherently flawed because it inappropriately subjects everything, 
including significant rights, to a cost-benefit analysis.  According to the 
neoclassical economic model, if the ADA’s reasonable accommodation 
provision is characterized as at least partially intended to enhance 
efficiency by correcting market failures,155 then where the cost of 
accommodation exceeds its benefits, the employer should be able to 
invoke the undue hardship defense and avoid making the 
accommodation, because otherwise an inefficient activity will take place 
and will reduce total wealth. 
However, authors such as Gregory Crespi have forcefully argued that 
this principally economic interpretation of the ADA is incorrect and 
inappropriate: 
The language of the statute, its legislative history, and the 
inapplicability in the disability employment accommodation context 
of the key premises underlying the economic efficiency orientation 
all indicate that little if any weight should be given to efficiency 
considerations in determining the availability of the undue hardship 
defense for ADA-covered employers.156 
B.  The Language of Rights and the ADA 
As the quote above suggests, the language of rights is an alternative to 
the language of efficiency.157  In political theory, rights have been 
understood as a serious entitlement that people have to some liberty, 
service, or good, derived from social rules and institutional roles.  Once a 
right is recognized, it can be guaranteed through a legal enactment and 
legally enforced through law.  Rights are not subject to utilitarian 
 
WITH DISABILITIES 209, 212-14 (2000) (citing study commissioned by Sears, Roebuck, and 
Co. that indicated the average costs to Sears for terminating and replacing an employee 
was $1,800 and $2,400, respectively).  Another benefit may be a reduction of the labor 
market costs of churning and scarring.  See J. Hoult Verkerke, An Economic Defense of 
Disability Discrimination Law at http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=170014. 
 155  Crespi, supra note 151, at 6-7. 
 156  Id.; see also Rebecca Hanner White, Deference and Disability Discrimination, 99 MICH. L. 
REV. 532 (2000) (arguing jurisprudential and policy considerations strongly favor judicial 
deference to the EEOC’s interpretation of the ADA). 
 157  Although rights are the subject of deep skepticism on the left, the possibility that 
rights are valuable, not only as a means in the political struggle, but as ends in themselves, 
has not been totally abandoned.  See generally Anthony Chase, The Left on Rights:  An 
Introduction 62 TEX. L. REV. 1541 (1984). 
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analysis.  As Ronald Dworkin has argued, “a right is a claim which the 
government would be wrong to override if the government’s only 
grounds were that overriding the right would increase the well being of 
the community as a whole.  Thus, a right is a claim to have a certain need 
satisfied even if having this need satisfied causes a decrease in total or 
average utility.”158 
1.  Negative and Positive Rights 
Rights can be classified in different ways. One of the most influential 
classifications, and the one most relevant to an examination of attitudes 
toward disability-based discrimination, is Isaiah Berlin’s concept of 
positive and negative liberties.159  Briefly stated, a negative right is 
freedom from interference.  Classic examples of negative rights include 
fundamental freedoms such as freedom of speech, religious tolerance, 
and freedom from arbitrary arrest.  A positive right is a freedom to act in 
a positive way, which entails the provision by some individual or 
institution of a valued service.  Thus, positive rights require the state to 
act positively to promote the well being of its citizens, rather than merely 
refraining from interfering. 
Modern courts accept the negative rights model in Constitutional 
interpretation, and civil rights laws are generally interpreted as 
declarations of negative liberty.160  However, classification of the ADA 
has been controversial because disability law and policy has traditionally 
been framed as positive entitlements to benefits or services, designed to 
assist those who are presumed to be dependent and not self-sufficient.161  
To paraphrase two disability scholars, it is one thing to repeal the 
ordinances that require certain kinds of people to use the back door, but 
quite another to require the construction of ramps, instead of or in 
addition to stairs, up to the door.162  As one author has noted, “[c]laiming 
 
 158  Baker, supra note 137, at 48. 
 159  See generally Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118 
(Oxford 1969). 
 160  See, e.g., David P. Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 
864 (1986); Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution:  A Critique, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2271 
(1990). 
 161  See, e.g., IDEA, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1485 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); Developmental 
Disabilities Bill of Rights Act of 1975, amended by 42 U.S.C. §§ 6000-83 (1994); Air Carrier 
Access Act of 1986, 49 U.S.C. § 41705 (1994); Voting Accessibility for the Elderly and 
Handicapped Act of 1984, 42 U.S.C. 1973ee (1994); Sections 501 and 503 of the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 791-797(b)(f) (1994 & Supp. III 1997); Fair Housing 
Act Amendments of 1988 (FHAA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1994 & Supp III. 1997). 
 162  Francis & Silvers, supra note 5, at xvii. 
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a right to needs-based allocation generates powerful normative dissonance, 
because where political rights are implicated, people expect allocations 
to be based on the principle of equality, under which everyone is treated 
the same.”163  Consider, for example, the passionate public responses to 
golfer Casey Martin’s suit against the PGA pursuant to the public 
accommodation title of the ADA:164 
“Casey Martin has always known that the PGA Tour requires 
walking in order to compete, yet he feels he is special enough to 
warrant special consideration.  How much more selfish can you 
get?” 
. . . 
“So what if you have had to face some adversity or someone has 
died in your family?  If you don’t qualify for the competition, you 
simply don’t play at that level . . . . [Q]uit contributing to this stupid 
theory that because someone can make you feel sorry for them they 
deserve different treatment. . . Be a Man!”165 
Some have argued that the ADA is a welcome change from traditional 
disability policy because it promotes negative rights.  In particular, 
philosopher Anita Silvers asserts that the ADA simply requires the 
removal of barriers that make it more difficult for some than for others to 
have access to major means of achieving the good life, such as education, 
 
 163  Linda Hamilton Krieger, Afterword:  Socio-Legal Backlash, 21 BERKELEY. J. OF EMP. & 
LAB. L. 476, 509 (2000).  Walter Y. Oi, Disability and a Workfare-Welfare Dilemma, in 
DISABILITY AND WORK:  INCENTIVES, RIGHTS AND OPPORTUNITIES 32 (Carolyn L. Weaver ed. 
1991).  (“the ADA undermines the goal of living independently; disabled people cannot 
have it both ways. They cannot achieve true independence by demanding equal job 
opportunities and equal access when the social costs of these rights are thrust upon the 
general public.”). 
 164  PGA Tour Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 690 (2001) (holding that allowing disabled 
golfer use of golf cart was required by Title III of ADA, despite walking requirements that 
applied to association’s tours). 
 165  Alan Shipnuck, Martin Ruling Still a Hot Topic, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (June 6, 2001), 
available at http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/inside_game/alan_shipnuck/news/2001/06 
/11/on_tour/index.html.  Compare the interview with Andrew Imparato, a disability 
activist with the American Association of People with Disabilities.  CNN Access, Disability 
Activist on Martin Decision (May 29, 2001), available at http://www.cnn.com/2001/law/05 
/29/scotus.golfer.cnn/index.html (“We saw this case as not being about an unfair 
advantage or special treatment, but about all athletes having an opportunity to compete.”).  
See also Cary LaCheen, Achy Breaky Pelvis, Lumber Lung and the Juggler’s Despair:  The 
Portrayal of the Americans with Disabilities Act on Television and Radio, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & 
LAB. L. 223 (2000). 
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employment, or health care.166  Because those barriers result from 
unfairly exclusionary or injurious practices,167 Silvers and others argue 
that the ADA merely corrects a market shaped by discrimination.168  In 
addition, the employment title promotes a traditional concept of equality 
of opportunity that merely limits the manner in which employers can 
treat employees.  Silvers conceptualizes this as “formal justice,” which 
“aims at reforming processes central to the achievement of moral 
connectedness so as to ensure their inclusiveness regardless of 
disability,”169 and “[o]ffers recourse to individuals when mistaken or 
misleading assumptions about disability weight commonplace practices 
against them.”170  Thus, the ADA is not about special benefits or 
redistribution of material resources — a goal which would not address 
the systemic bias that disadvantages people with disabilities — but 
instead promotes access comparable to that of people without 
disabilities.171 
More often, however, the ADA and its employment title are 
understood as conveying positive rights, as it requires that employers 
both refrain from discrimination and make affirmative reasonable 
accommodations.172  Significantly, the duty to reasonably accommodate 
is not merely corrective because it is not premised on a showing of past 
discrimination.  As such, Title I’s reasonable accommodation provision 
“appears to make a revolutionary break with the old ways of thinking 
about discrimination while charting a new course of affirmative 
obligations to ensure real equality.”173 
2.  Critique of the Negative-Positive Dichotomy 
The familiar critiques of the negative-positive dichotomy also fall 
along two lines.  First, there are arguments about which category certain 
 
 166  Silvers, Formal Justice, supra note 133, at 13; Anita Silvers, (In)Equality, (Ab)Normality, 
and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 21 J. MED. AND PHIL. 209 (1996) [hereinafter Silvers, 
(In)Equality]. 
 167  Silvers, Formal Justice, supra note 133, at 132. 
 168  Richard J. Arneson, Disability, Discrimination and Priority, in AMERICANS WITH 
DISABILITIES 18 (2000). 
 169  Id. at 121. 
 170  Id. at 120. 
 171  Silvers, Formal Justice, supra note 133, at 13; Silvers, (In)Equality, supra note 166, at 
209. 
 172  David Wasserman, Distributive Justice, in DISABILITY, DIFFERENCE, DISCRIMINATION 
147 (1998); see also Miranda Oshige McGowan, Reconsidering the Americans with Disabilities 
Act, 35 GA. L. REV. 27, 35 (2000). 
 173  McGowan, supra note 172, at 35. 
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rights fit into.  For example, many have argued that there have always 
been both negative and positive rights within the Constitution.174 As 
David Currie notes, “[f]rom the beginning there have been cases in 
which the Supreme Court, sometimes very persuasively, has found in 
negatively phrased provisions constitutional duties that can in some 
sense be described as positive.”175 
Others challenge the dichotomy itself as false,176 as even classically 
conceived negative rights require some sort of government funding or 
state intervention.177  Building upon the insights of the legal realists “to 
the extent that rights enforcement depends upon judicial vigilance, rights 
cost, at a minimum, whatever it costs to recruit, train, supply, pay and 
(in turn) monitor the judicial custodians of our basic rights.” 178  As one 
scholar has remarked, “[l]eave me alone” is not a transcendent, context-
free right, but a  “rhetorical front behind which the meaning, costs, and 
consequences of negative rights lie concealed.”179  Certainly, there have 
been costs of eradicating discrimination in the workplace — shifting 
patterns and practices have always entailed costs.  For example, Title 
IV’s prohibition against sexual harassment in the workplace is “enforced 
through the not-inexpensive efforts of the EEOC and state employment 
agencies.”180  Indeed, Title VII has provided women with a “positive 
right to a less offensive workplace.”181  In this sense, the employment title 
of the ADA is not unique, just more overt.182 
There are two possible consequences of this latter critique of the 
negative-positive dichotomy.  A blurry or nonexistent boundary may 
justify further extension into the area of positive rights.  Indeed, some 
 
 174  Currie, supra note 160, at 864; Bandes, supra note 160, at 2271 (offering philosophical 
and common sources of conventional wisdom); Laurence H. Tribe, The Abortion Funding 
Conundrum:  Inalienable Rights, Affirmative Duties, and the Dilemma of Dependence, 99 HARV. L. 
REV. 330 (1985). 
 175  Currie, supra note 160, at 886. 
 176  For a feminist critique of the foundations of both negative and positive liberty, see 
Diana Coole, Constructing and Deconstructing Liberty:  A Feminist and Poststructuralist 
Analysis, XLI(1) POL. STUD. 83-95 (1993). 
 177  Aditi Gowri, Reproduction, Rights and Public Policy:  A Framework for Assessment, 35 
TEX. INT’L L.J. 13 (2000). 
 178  Patricia Illingworth & Wendy E. Parmet, Positively Disabled:  The Relationship Between 
the Definition of Disability and Rights under the ADA, in AMERICANS WITH DISABILITES 6 (2000) 
(citing HOLMES & SUNSTEIN, infra note 184 at 45).  But see Tucker, supra note 52, at 336. 
 179  Gowri, supra note 177, at 18. 
  180  Illingworth & Parmet, supra note 178, at 13. 
  181  Id. 
  
182
  Id.  See also Stein, supra note 139, at 314 (ADA does not radically depart from other 
civil rights statutes and reasonable accommodation is not uniquely expensive).  
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have praised the ADA for its embodiment of both positive and negative 
rights — ”The genius of the ADA is that it forthrightly melds positive 
and negative rights, creating a civil rights statute that goes beyond the 
simplistic equal-opportunity-as-negative-rights model represented by 
Title VII.”183  The more troubling consequence is the subjection of all 
rights to a cost-benefit analysis.  For example, Steven Holmes and Cass 
Sunstein assert that both the conservative and the liberal positions in the 
current debate unquestioningly accept the negative/positive distinction, 
and therefore either ignore the true cost of “rights” or reject all 
consideration of the costs of “rights,” respectively.  Instead, the scope of 
any right always demands a trade-off analysis that weighs the expected 
social costs of enforcing a particular right against those of those rights, 
legal entitlement, and public policy objectives.184 
IV.  BACK TO THE THREE FACES OF REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION 
As identified in Section I, despite a decade of litigation, there is no 
consistent understanding of the reasonable accommodation requirement.  
Indeed, there are three inconsistent distributive outcomes that appear to 
comport with the reasonable accommodation requirement:  cost-shifting, 
cost-sharing, and cost-avoidance.  Such disparate outcomes exist for two 
reasons: a failure to develop a coherent and consistent theory of 
disability, and an ambivalent attitude toward the costs of 
antidiscrimination law.  Accordingly, using a theory of disability 
informed by an experiential definition of health and the associated 
distributive analysis developed in sections II and III, respectively, this 
section contextualizes and evaluates cost avoidance, cost sharing, and 
cost shifting. 
A.  Cost Avoidance is an Unwelcome Return to the Past 
Cost avoidance, whereby ERISA-regulated disability benefits and the 




  Illingworth & Parmet, supra note 178, at 8. 
  
184 STEPHEN HOLMES & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST OF RIGHTS:  WHY LIBERTY DEPENDS 
ON TAXES (W.W. Norton 1999).  Both the conservative and the liberal positions in the 
current debate unquestioningly accept the negative/positive distinction, and therefore 
either ignore the true cost of “rights” or reject all consideration of the costs of “rights,” 
respectively.  Instead, the scope of any right always demands a trade-off analysis that 
weighs the expected social costs of enforcing a particular right against those of those rights, 
legal entitlement and public policy objective. For a review and criticism, see generally 
Jonathan M. Barnett, Rights, Costs, and the Incommensurability Problem, 86 VA. L. REV. 1303 
(2000). 
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consciously or unconsciously, the duty of reasonable accommodation of 
employees with disabilities, returns to a strong medical-functional model 
of disability and operates as a modern form of safety net for those 
deemed unfit for the self-defined workplace. 
1.  A Strong Medical-Functional Model of Disability 
The cost avoidance outcome is strongly linked with the traditional 
medical model of disability and the functional model of health.  The 
worker with a disability is seen as biologically abnormal, inferior, and 
unfit for the demands of the workplace.  The emphasis on individual 
biological function and impairment to the exclusion of environmental 
context makes the unemployment of people with disabilities appear as a 
“simple fact of nature” rather than a social phenomenon.185 
Cost avoidance also places the (seemingly) objective science of 
medicine at the center of the process, as most plans require a worker to 
submit sufficient objective medical evidence of his or her disability as 
part of the benefits application process.186 Clinical measurement and 
verification of disability, and particularly  the use of indexes to evaluate 
function according to the ability to perform tasks, are prevalent.187 
Individual physicians serve “to validate the existence of the disability 
and therefore provide an individual with access to whatever social 
assistance may be available to disabled persons.”188  Despite the use of 
physicians as gatekeepers, the definition of disability is frequently keyed 
to the person’s ability to perform his or her job.  In other words, 
disability is the medically verified inability to work.189  Insistence upon 
individual, clinical verification medicalizes, and therefore depoliticizes, 
the social causes of disability.190 
 
  185 Amundson, supra note 92, at 105. 
  
186 See cases cited, supra note 38. 
  
187 See cases cited, supra note 38; Vlas v. Raythem Employees Disability Trust, 244 F.3d 
27 (1st Cir. 2001); Goad v. Lockheed Martin Energy Systems, Inc., 8 Fed. Appx. 524, 2001 
WL 493403 (6th Cir. 2001); Heller v. Fortis Benefits Ins. Co., 142 F.3d 487 (D.C. Cir. 1998); see 
also, Patrick et al., supra note 105. 
  
188 Crossley, supra note 56, at 650. 
  
189 See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1) (1994); Kaplan, supra note 109, at 354. 
  190 Lupton, supra note 132, at 108 (“doctors are called upon to make authoritative 
judgments for the legal system, employers and other social authorities; for example, when 
examining an employee for superannuating purposes or sick leave certification, or when 
assessing the extent of disability of the disabled, or when pronouncing death.  Doctors have 
the power to certify whether a person is physically able to work or not, and to decide when 
a patient should return to work.  This doctor-patient interaction may reinforce the 
definition of health as the ability to work, for ‘the healthy person is the person who 
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From the perspective of a former worker with a disability, “[b]eing 
seen as the object of medical treatment evokes the image of many 
ascribed traits, such as weakness, helplessness, dependency, 
regressiveness, abnormality of appearance, and depreciation of every 
mode of physical and mental functioning.”191  It may also require him or 
her to assume the sick role, which excuses the individual from the 
normal obligations of society, including going to work.192  According to 
American sociologist Talcott Parsons, “ill persons are exempted from the 
performance of social obligations which they are normally expected to 
fulfill, they are not blamed for their condition, and they need not feel 
guilty when they do not fulfill their normal obligations; however, ill 
people must want to try and get well — if they do not, they can be 
accused of malingering; and being sick is defined as being in need of 
medical help to return to ‘normality’ — the sick must put themselves 
into the hands of medical practitioners to help them get well again.”193 
The emphasis on the disability and the assumption of the sick role may 
also trigger the spoiling process, whereby the physical impairment 
obscures all other characteristics behind the one and swallows up the 
social identity of the individual within that restrictive category.194 
2.  Special Distributions for Unsuitable Workers 
Because disability is seen as a personal misfortune, a private and 
voluntary remedy such as cost avoidance appears appropriate.  ERISA 
does not require that employers provide disability benefits or provide 
any minimum benefits or eligibility standards.  No employee with a 
disability has a right to insist that his employer provide disability 
benefits, although many employers choose to do so. Moreover, any 
benefits or assistance that the employer chooses to offer are subject to the 
terms of the plan drafted and agreed upon by the employer and the 
insurance company, if any. 
The cost-avoidance outcome deems disability a legitimate excuse from 
economic self-sufficiency, and provides disability benefits as a safety net. 
The cost avoidance model looks a lot like traditional U.S. disability 
 
produces.’”).  See also Berg, supra note 11, at 44 (“[a] practice of determining disability on an 
individualized basis undermines a sustained political consciousness among people with 
disabilities, and, in turn, undermines a unified disability rights movement.”). 
  
191 Irving Kenneth Zola, Self, Identity, and the Naming Question:  Reflection on the Language 
of Disability, in THE SOCIAL MEDICINE READER 77, 79 (Gail E. Henderson et al. eds, 1997). 
  192 Kaplan, supra note 109, at 353-54. 
  193 Lupton, supra note 132, at 7. 
  194 Zola, supra note 191, at 79. 
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policy, such as the Social Security Disability Insurance and Supplemental 
Security Income Benefits (“SSDIB”) program, which guarantees a 
subsistence income to persons with total, long-term disabilities.195  
Neither of these traditional programs nor the cost-avoidance outcome 
offers individuals enough money to participate fully in the life of the 
community, or the status and satisfaction that come from economic self-
sufficiency.196 
The construction of the disability benefits also strongly suggests that 
employees with disabilities either “overcome” their limitations in order 
to meet the non-negotiable demands of the workplace, or remain 
permanently unemployed.  The worker with a disability is seen as 
simply unable to work and unsuitable for the work environment.  
Instead of examining environmental barriers, the best way to help the 
disabled person is to use either medicine to cure or ameliorate the 
impairment, or rehabilitation techniques to enable the person to cope 
with or overcome the impairment’s effects.  “The primary thrusts of 
social policy regarding disability are both to eliminate as much disability 
as possible, by using medical technology to cure existing disability or 
prevent future disability, and to use rehabilitative techniques to help 
disabled individuals approximate dominant physical standards as 
closely as possible.”197  The two-tiered definition of disability common to 
many plans suggests that disability from your “own occupation” should 
be temporary — the former employee on disability leave is encouraged 
to overcome the disability through medical care,198 to seek medical care 
to heal or “adapt themselves to the demands of productivity set in the 
marketplace.”199  After expiration of that period, the worker will either 
return to his occupation,200 retrain for another suitable occupation, or 
 
  
195 See 42 U.S.C. § 423 (1994) (SSDIB), 42 U.S.C. § 1382 (SSI) (1994). 
  196 See David E. Bernstein, Roots of the Underclass:  The Decline of Laissez-Faire 
Jurisprudence and the Rise of Racist Labor Legislation, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 85, 119-36 (1993), for 
the position that welfare programs tend to trap individuals in a low-income underclass, 
and are therefore less desirable than measures that lead to integration into the workforce. 
  197 Crossley, supra note 56, at 652. 
  198 And, an employee is often required to have continuous medical care to continue to 
receive benefits.  See, e.g., Lown v. Continental Cas. Co., 238 F.3d 543, 549 (4th Cir. 2001) 
(defining total disability as “continuously unable to perform the substantial and material 
duties of his regular occupation . . . and under the regular care of a licensed physician other 
than himself”). 
  
199 See Scotch, supra note 3, at 219. 
  
200 At least one court has held that even an involuntary return to work for financial 
reasons disqualifies an employee from receiving disability benefits.  Galman v. The 
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 15415 (8th Cir. June 28, 2001).  In that 
case, the court rejected plaintiff ‘s argument that such a bright-line test created an incentive 
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remain unemployed and continue to collect available benefits. 
By focusing on adaptations required from people with disabilities, the 
cost-avoidance outcome requires very little from employers beyond 
establishment of a disability benefits plan.  It does not incorporate any 
concept of reasonable accommodation or any other form of 
environmental alteration.201  Thus, private employers continue to define 
work and “normal” workplace standards.202  There is no recognition of 
the disability category as a political and nonneutral instrument of the 
employer to control the workforce.203  Consider Professor Susan 
Wendell’s personal example of disabling workplace rulemaking: 
I am currently just able (by doing very little else) to work as a 
professor three-quarter time, on one-quarter disability leave.  There 
has been much talk recently about possible increases in the teaching 
duties of professors at my university, which would not be 
accompanied by any reduction in expectations for the other two 
components of our jobs, research and administration.  If there were 
to be such an increase in the pace of professors’ work, say by one 
additional course per term, I would be unable to work more than 
half-time (by the new standards) and would have to request half-
time disability leave, even though there had been no changes in my 
physical condition.  Compared to my colleagues, I would be more 
work-disabled than I am now.  Some professors with less physical 
limitation than I have, who now work full-time, might be unable to 
work at the new full-time pace and be forced to go on part-time 
disability leave.  This sort of change could contribute to disabling 
anyone in any job.204 
Or consider an example from a recent Supreme Court case, Toyota Motor 
Manufacturing v. Williams.205  Ms. Williams began working at an 
automobile manufacturing plant in 1990 on the engine fabrication 
assembly line.  When use of the pneumatic tools on the assembly line 
caused pain in her hands, wrists, and arms, diagnosed as bilateral carpal 
 
for ERISA fiduciaries “to initially deny claims, force employees back into the workplace, 
and then deny the claim again on appeal on the basis that the employee is working.”  Id. at 
*5. 
  
201 Scotch, supra note 3, at 217. 
  
202 Iris Marion Young, Disability and the Definition of Work, in AMERICANS WITH 
DISABILITIES 171 (2000). 
  203 Id. at 171-73. 
  204 SUSAN WENDELL, THE REJECTED BODY: FEMINIST PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS ON 
DISABILITY 38 (1996). 
  205 534 U.S. 184 (2002). 
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tunnel syndrome and bilateral tendonitis, she was transferred to 
modified duty jobs.  In 1993, she was transferred to a paint and body 
inspection line, which required visual and manual inspection tasks.  In 
light of her medical restrictions, she performed only the visual inspection 
for several years without incident.  However, in 1996,  her employer 
instituted a new requirement that all paint and body inspection line 
employees perform both visual and manual inspection, and she once 
again began to experience pain in her neck and shoulders that interfered 
with her ability to perform her job.  Thus, Ms. Williams was transformed 
from adequate worker to inadequate worker by virtue of her employer’s 
policy change in 1996. 
In the realm of disability policy, the idea that rules can disable is not 
new.  In fact, one early definition of the word “disabled” is “incapacity 
recognized or created by law; legal disqualification.”206  To disable a 
person is to disqualify legally, to pronounce legally incapable.  The 
“disabling” of employees who could perform the essential function of 
their jobs with reasonable accommodation is particularly disturbing 
because people with disabilities want to work.  A survey cited in the 
legislative history of the ADA reports that a large majority of the two-
thirds of working age persons with disabilities who do not have jobs say 
that they want to work and 82% of people with disabilities said they 
would give up their government benefits in favor of a full-time job.207  A 
more recent survey by the Harris polling organization reported that of 
persons who identified themselves as having disabilities who were not 
working and were ages 16 to 64, 79% said that they would prefer to be 
working.208 
Finally, the cost-avoidance outcome is incompatible with the stated 
purpose of the ADA “to provide a clear and comprehensive national 
mandate to end discrimination against individuals with disabilities” and 
“to bring those individuals into the economic and social mainstream of 
American life.”209  Instead, it looks like a private, voluntary form of the 
traditional U.S. policy toward people with disabilities, the creation of a 
 
  206 NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 682 (Leslie Brown ed., Clarendon Press 
1993). 
   
207 H. R. Rep. No. 101-485 (II), pt. 2, at 32 (1990) (citing the ICD Survey of Disabled 
Americans:  Bringing Disabled Americans into the Mainstream 47-50), reprinted in 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 314. 
  
208 LOUIS HARRIS & ASSOCS., N.O.D./HARRIS SURVEY OF AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES 
55 (1994).  A recent survey in a large state found that  72% of persons with disabilities who 
are unemployed want to work.  Minette McGhee, Justice is Blind-for One Day:  Court Gets 
Lesson on Disability, CHI. SUN TIMES, Nov. 19, 1992, at 22. 
  
209 42 U.S.C. §12101-12213 (Supp. V 1990). 
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public entitlement program such as SSDIB, that trades inclusion in the 
workplace for cash benefits.  In contrast to the ADA, the alternate 
statutory structure into which workers are diverted, ERISA, is clearly not  
a civil rights statue, nor is its sole aim to protect workers.210  Indeed, it 
strips the plaintiff of civil rights protections and offers very little 
procedural or substantive protection in return.  Thus, the practical result 
of the cost avoidance outcome for people with disabilities  exclusion, 
isolation, and economic dependence  is the very problem that the ADA 
seeks to remedy. 
B.  Cost-Sharing is an Uncertain Bargain 
Cost-sharing, whereby the structure of reasonable accommodation and 
undue hardship creates a zone of bargaining in which the minimum the 
individual with a disability is willing to accept is less than the maximum 
the employer is willing to offer, is linked to a weaker medical-functional 
model of disability and offers only the possibility of a privately 
negotiated remedy. 
1.  A Weak Medical-Functional Model of Disability 
As with the cost-avoidance outcome, the worker with a disability is 
seen as biologically abnormal and inferior and potentially unfit for the 
workplace.  However, the consequence of the impairment is subject to 
negotiation.  There is at least the possibility of focusing on 
environmental issues, such as changes to the workplace, in addition to 
the individual biological functioning and impairment, but certainly no 
guarantees. 
It is not clear whether the cost-sharing model appoints the physician 
as gatekeeper, as individual employers may or may not require objective 
medical evidence or ongoing medical care.  However, the definition of 
disability would still be keyed to the individual’s ability to perform her 
job, as defined by the employer. 
2.  Bargaining for Benefits 
As with the cost-avoidance outcome, the cost-sharing outcome 
recognizes that certain types of impairments can lead to social and 
economic isolation.  However, because disability is seen as a personal 
 
  210 See, e.g., Erik Nelson, Comment, A Poststructural Analysis of the Power and Class 
Behind the Formalist Application of ERISA Preemption of State Law, 11 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 175 
(1998). 
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misfortune, a private and voluntary contractual remedy appears 
appropriate.  Again, employees with a disability do not have a right to 
insist that their employers bargain with them over accommodations, 
although the structure of the incentives within the ADA may influence 
employers’ decisions to do so.211  Moreover, any benefits or assistance 
that the employers choose to offer are subjected to the terms of the 
negotiated agreement. 
Cost sharing preserves, to the extent possible, the freedom of the 
employer and the employee to bargain and to reach a mutually 
satisfying agreement.  Because both parties have a direct interest in the 
outcome, cost sharing may focus more on the specific needs and desires 
of the parties and provide an opportunity for a quick, economical, and 
creative resolution.  Evidence suggests that the vast majority of ADA 
disputes arise in cases in which the employee is already working for the 
employer,212 and the cost-sharing outcome may be particularly useful for 
such employees.  It seems logical that an employee with a satisfactory 
employment relationship would be most likely to request and receive 
accommodations that would allow him or her to continue employment. 
Although cost sharing may result in some accommodation of people 
with disabilities, according to Karlan and Rutherglen, the zone of 
bargaining operates to decrease costs of accommodations, thus lessening 
the impact of the property transfer.213  This may be exacerbated by the 
fact that the potential plaintiff faces a substantial risk in the courts.  As 
disability scholar Ruth Colker has documented, appellate court decisions 
in ADA cases have been overwhelmingly pro-defendant since the ADA 
became effective.214  Thus the end result is likely distributions to 





  211 See Burkhauser, supra note 30, at 79 (“When a pathology begins to affect the ability to 
work, important job related decisions must be made by both worker and employer.  These 
decisions may also be influenced by government policies.  The worker will consider the 
relative rewards of continued work versus applying for transfer benefits.  In like manner, 
the social institutions and legal mandates within which the firm must operate will 
influence an employer’s willingness to accommodate the worker.”). 
  212 See John J. Donahue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment 
Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN L. REV. 983, 984 (1991); Mudrick, supra note 23, at 70, cited 
in Scotch, supra note 3, at 220. 
  213 See Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 27, at 30. 
  
214 Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act:  A Windfall for Defendants, 34 HARV. 
C.R-C.L. L. REV. 99, 101 (1999). 
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As with cost avoidance, cost sharing is problematic for those 
antidiscrimination theorists who advocate a civil rights strategy.215  
Agreements are reached informally by private, interested actors, without 
procedural protections or the public forum of the federal courts.  Use of 
this process may result in a diminished ability to identify and resolve 
systemic, disability-based discrimination.216  There is also no assurance 
that employers will share their power to define work and acceptable 
workplace standards,217 nor is there necessarily a recognition of the 
disability category as a political and nonneutral instrument of the 
employer to control the workforce.  Although cost sharing has potential, 
it appears to minimize any material redistribution as well as the 
opportunity for cultural transformation. 
C.  Though Flawed, Cost Shifting is the Best Outcome 
Cost shifting, whereby employers meet their obligation to provide 
reasonable accommodation to make it possible for people with 
disabilities to perform essential job functions and to secure equal 
enjoyment of all terms and conditions of employers, faces significant 
obstacles to implementation.  Nonetheless, it is the best outcome because 
it embodies a experiential-social model of disability and the potential for 
both socioeconomic and political reconstruction. 
1.  A Potentially Strong Experiential-Social Model of Disability 
Cost shifting shares strong links to a experiential-social model of 
disability, which characterizes disability as subjective, flexible, and 
profoundly contextual.  The experiential-social model of disability rejects 
making the impairment, pathology, or disease primary.  In this sense, a 
person with a disability need not be defined by that disability or 
experience a spoiling of identity.218  There is a great deal of empirical 
 
  215 Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 27, at 4-5. 
  
216 These concerns echo the analysis of mediation and the ADA.  See Ann C. Hodges, 
Mediation and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 30 GA. L. REV. 431 (1996); see also 2000 H.R. 
4593 (a bill to amend Title VII, the ADEA, the ADA, the VRA and the Civil Rights Act of 
1991 to require the EEOC to mediate employee claims arising under those acts). 
  217 Young, supra note 202, at 171-73. 
  218 “An investigation of 145 physically disabled individuals found that, compared to 
non-disabled persons, those with impairments did not rate their lives as less happy or 
satisfying.  The people with disabilities did, however, rate their lives as more difficult and 
likely to stay that way.  Another study of 88 seriously physically restricted persons posed 
the question, ‘If you were given one wish, would you wish that you were no longer 
disabled?’  Only half said they would wish to remove their disability.”  Experiences of 
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evidence that people with even serious disabilities report a quality of life 
averaging only slightly lower than that reported by nondisabled 
people.219 For example, one study indicated that people with 
impairments rated their lives as more difficult, but not less happy or 
satisfying.  Moreover, only half would use one wish to remove their 
disability.220  Interestingly, physicians in particular estimate the quality of 
life of their disabled patients to be much lower than do the patients 
themselves.221 
The ADA provides that any impairment or inability must be viewed in 
the context of the interaction between societal realities and choices and 
the individual’s disability, and not in the context of the individual’s 
disability per se.  In that sense, the ADA’s explicit portrayal of disability 
as socially constructed embodies the experiential-social model.  Both 
recognize that disability is a relational term, defined by individuals’ 
relationship to their specific environment.  Rather than simply an 
objective biological impairment, disability is an “uncorrected mismatch 
between an individual and her environment.”222  Accordingly, the 
disadvantaged status of persons with disabilities is the product of a 
hostile or inhospitable social environment, not simply the product of 
bodily defects:223 
[D]isability is socially constructed by such factors as social 
conditions that cause or fail to prevent damage to people’s bodies; 
expectations of performance; the physical and social organization of 
societies on the basis of a young, non-disabled, “ideally shaped,” 
healthy adult male paradigm of citizens; the failure or unwillingness 
to create ability among citizens who do not fit the paradigm; and 
cultural representations, failures of representation, and 
expectations.  Much, but perhaps not all, of what can be socially 
constructed can be socially (and not just intellectually) 
deconstructed, given the means and the will.224 
 
Deviance, Chronic Illness, and Disability, in THE SOCIAL MEDICINE READER, 76 (Gail E. 
Henderson et al., eds. 1997). 
  
219 Amundson, supra note 92, at 106. 
  
220 Experiences of Deviance, supra note 218, at 76. 
  221 Amundson, supra note 92, at 106; Harlan Hahn, Accommodation and the ADA: 
Unreasonable Bias or Biased Reasoning?, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 166 (2000). 
  222 Arneson, supra note 168, at 28. 
  
223 See id. (using example of wealthy, talented, charming, legless person).  An example 
of how construction of physical environments can create disability is the construction of 
buildings with stairs, rather than elevators or ramps. 
  224 WENDELL, supra note 204, at 45. 
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The inequality visited upon persons with disabilities is rooted in social 
practices that bar them from demonstrating their competence, not their 
impairment, real or perceived.  For example, from the perspective of 
people who use wheelchairs, “disablement is experienced not as the 
absence of walking but as the absence of access to bathrooms, theaters, 
transportation, the workplace, medical services, and educational 
programs  all those opportunities most other citizens expect to 
access.225  In the words of another author, “if a person in a wheelchair 
cannot get to the post office in her town because there is no ramp or 
elevator, a socio-political analysis will locate the problem in the design of 
the building, not in her legs.” 226 
2.  An Opportunity for Redistribution and Social Reconstruction 
Reasonable accommodation as cost shifting goes beyond distribution 
of material resources, but also encompasses changes to the social 
environment.  In contrast to the medical-functional model, which seeks 
to rehabilitate the disabled person, the primary thrust of policy under the 
social model is to eliminate disability by “rehabilitating” the social 
constructs that serve to impose disadvantages on persons with 
impairments.227  It also recognizes and seeks to remedy the use of the 
disability category as a nonneutral instrument of the state and private 
employer to control the workforce. 
This dual value of reasonable accommodation as cost shifting 
resonates with Nancy Fraser’s concept of a “critical theory of 
recognition.”228  Fraser, a political scientist, developed a concept of 
“bivalent collectivities” that suffer “both socioeconomic maldistribution 
and cultural misrecognition in forms where neither of these injustices is 
an indirect effect of the other, but where both are primary and co-
original.”229  For such collectivities, neither redistributive remedies 
addressing socioeconomic injustice nor recognition remedies addressing 
 
  225 Silvers, Formal Justice, supra note 133, at 74. 
  226 Bickenbach et. al, supra note 91, at 1174. 
  
227 Crossley, supra note 56, at 658. 
  228 Nancy Fraser, From Redistribution to Recognition? Dilemmas of Justice in a ‘Post-
Socialist’ Age, in FEMINISM AND POLITICS 431 (Anne Phillips ed., 1998). 
  229 Id.  Fraser explains, “[t]he remedy for economic injustice is political-economic 
restructuring of some sort.  This might involve redistributing income, reorganizing the 
division of labour, subjecting investment to democratic decision-making, or transforming 
other basic economic structures. . . . The remedy for cultural injustice, in contrast, is some 
sort of cultural or symbolic change.  This could involve upwardly revaluing disrespected 
identities and the cultural products of maligned groups.”  Id. at 434. 
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cultural or symbolic injustice alone will suffice.230 
Finally, unlike cost avoidance and cost sharing, cost shifting occurs by 
operation of the ADA and takes an explicit civil rights approach to the 
issue of disability-based discrimination.  The ADA prohibits 
impairment-based subordination, and promotes the view that disability 
is not an inherent biological trait, but a “condition that results from the 
interaction between some physical or mental characteristic labeled as 
impairment and the contingent decisions that have made physical and 
social structures inaccessible to people with that condition.”231  
Accordingly, the appropriate remedy is civil rights legislation to 
eliminate the attitudes and practices that exclude people with actual, 
past, or perceived impairments from opportunities to participate in 
public and private life.232 
3.  Addressing the Obstacles 
Although supported in the history and language of the ADA, the 
experiential-social model of disability and reasonable accommodation as 
cost shifting face significant barriers to  implementation.  It is a 
potentially transformative law captured by inappropriate biomedical 
and efficiency analyses.  However, the experiential-social model of 
disability and its distributive implications can be used to reconstruct 
reasonable accommodations flaws. 
The most problematic barrier for the experiential-social model of 
disability is the Supreme Court’s return to a narrower, biomedical model 
of disability.  As noted above, in the Supreme Court’s recent ADA cases 
on standing, Toyota Motor Manufacturing v. Williams,233  Sutton v. United 
Airlines,234 Murphy v. UPS,235 and Albertson’s v. Kirkingburg,236 the Supreme 
Court focused on whether or not the plaintiffs’ impairments severely 
damaged their capacity in everyday life, and not simply their capacity to 
perform their actual jobs.  In the words of the Williams court, “[w]hen 
addressing the major life activity of performing manual tasks, the central 
inquiry must be whether the claimant is unable to perform the variety of 
 
  
230 Id. at 431. 
  231 Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and Disability, 86 VA. L. REV. 398, 426 
(2000). 
  232 Id. 
  233 534 U.S. 184, 122 S. Ct. 681 (2002). 
  234 527 U.S. 471 (1999). 
  235 527 U.S. 516 (1999). 
  236 527 U.S. 555 (1999). 
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tasks central to most people’s daily lives, not whether the claimant is 
unable to perform the tasks associated with her specific job.”237  Such a 
restrictive category reduces the pool of eligible plaintiffs — ”[t]he 
judiciary’s insistence upon viewing disability as an essential, biomedical 
fact — and its resistance to adopting a social political perspective — has 
led to the construction of a highly restrictive category of disability that 
reserves the law’s protection for the relatively few who fit the American 
disabled ideal — men and women who struggle to independence and 
self-support despite the most incapacitating of impairments.”238  This has 
been a boon for defendants.239 
Despite the civil rights language, the civil rights approach often 
appears an uncomfortable fit.240  It appears that the Court’s acceptance of 
the “positive” aspect of ADA, the duty of reasonable accommodation, is 
premised upon a very narrow definition of disability.  Conversely, the 
Court’s relative acceptance of the “negative” aspects of the ADA, the 
duty to refrain from discrimination, results in significantly limited relief. 
Many argue for a rejection of the dichotomy — ”The underlying 
principle of the ADA is that people with a disability must be fully 
integrated into society — that we must recognize the potential of all 
members of society, disabled or not, even though it may cost money or 
impose some burdens upon covered entities to reach this objective”241 — 
however, this argument raises the risk that rights guaranteed by the 
ADA will be subject to a cost-benefit analysis.  In fact, the reasonable 
accommodation analysis is being compromised by an economic and 
 
  
237 Williams, 122 S. Ct. at 693. 
  238 Berg, supra note 11, at 49-50. 
  239 A comprehensive study of 1,200 court decisions by the ABA’s Commission on 
Mental and Physical Disability Law found that employers have prevailed in 92% of final 
judicial dispositions.  See Study Finds Employers Win Most ADA Title I Judicial and 
Administrative Complaints, 22 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 403 (1998); see also 
John W. Parry, Highlights and Trends:  Employment Decisions under ADA Title I Survey Update, 
23 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 290, 294 (1999) (reporting that in 1998, employers 
increased their win rate to 94%); Colker, supra note 214, at 160.  For an exploration of 
reasons for the seeming pattern of negative results, see Matthew Diller, supra note 82, at 19.  
Paula Berg has analyzed its tremendous negative impact on the issue of standing, noting 
that the majority of recent ADA decisions are exclusively concerned with the issue of 
standing — whether plaintiff is “disabled” as defined by the statute — and the majority 
conclude that they are not.  Berg, supra note 11, at 2. 
  240 “There are numerous cases in which judges have treated the ADA definition as 
though the purpose of the law is to provide a social benefit, rather than to protect an 
individual from discrimination.”  Kaplan, supra note 109, at 360-61, citing Van Sickle v. 
Automatic Data Processing Inc., 166 F.3d 1216 (6th Cir. 1998), and Gilday v. Mecosta 
County, 124 F.3d 760 (6th Cir. 1997). 
  241 Tucker, Revolving Door, supra note 52, at 351. 
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utilitarian analysis, in the form of the Court’s interpretation of the undue 
burden test.  The undue burden limitation severely limits the application 
of the reasonable accommodation requirement,242 and ultimately reflects  
business’s vision of integration as costly and intrusive.243  As Crespi has  
argued, a Pareto model of efficiency provides that a distribution is 
efficiency enhancing if it increases aggregate wealth, and also increases 
the wealth of all parties to it — a standard that few, if any, legal rules can 
satisfy.  In contrast, the more utilitarian Kaldor-Hicks formulation 
provides that a distribution is efficient if it generates aggregate benefits 
that exceed the total losses imposed, so that the winners could, in theory,  
compensate the losers so that no individual would be worse off than he 
or she was prior to the distribution and at least one person would be 
better off.  However, Crespi observes, such a utilitarian approach is on 
very tenuous grounds, especially in the disability employment context, 
because “the allowance of a set of undue hardship defense claims which 
individually and collectively satisfy Kaldor-Hicks . . . may well impose 
substantial losses upon some group of disabled persons.”244  Thus, the 
distinction between rights and entitlement is eroded by subjecting both 
to cost analysis.  “If interpretation of the ADA continues in this direction, 
it will increasingly function as a statute that balances limited 
opportunities against their perceived costs.”245 
CONCLUSION 
Using a theory of disability informed by an experiential-social 
definition of health and the distributive analysis to evaluate the three 
distributive outcomes demonstrates that, although flawed, cost shifting 
is the best outcome because it embodies a truer model of disability and 
the potential for both socioeconomic and political reconstruction. The 
experiential-social model of disability and its distributive implications 
can be used to reconstruct reasonable accommodation flaws — the 
reinvigoration of a conservative medical-functional model within the 
definition of disability, and the encroachment of an economic-based 
efficiency analysis within the reasonable accommodation analysis. 
 
  242 It also endorses the perpetrator’s and not the victim’s perspective.  See, e.g., MARTHA 
MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE:  INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW 167 
(1990). 
  
243 Sue A. Krenek, Note, Beyond Reasonable Accommodation, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1969, 1973 
(1994). 
  
244 Crespi, supra note 151, at 33. 
  245 Francis & Silvers, supra note 5, at xxiii. 
PENDO 5/28/2003  8:19 AM 
2002] Disability, Doctors and Dollars 1227 
This reconstruction offers the opportunity for a transition in disability 
policy from a necessary but not sufficient social safety net to a more 
complex system grounded in a fuller and more positive theory of 
disability, and the recognition of the civil rights of people with 
disabilities. 
